



R a d o v i m l a d i h

**EVROPSKA
BEZBEDNOST I
GEPOLITIČKE
PROMENE**





HELSINŠKI ODBOR ZA LJUDSKA PRAVA U SR BIJI

EVROPSKA BEZBEDNOST I GEOPOLITIČKE PROMENE

Publikacija je izrađena uz podršku regionalnog projekta SMART Balkan – Civilno društvo za povezan Zapadni Balkan, kojeg implementiraju Centar za promociju civilnog društva (CPCD), Center for Research and Policy Making (CRPM) i Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM), a finansijski podržava Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova Kraljevine Norveške. Sadržaj publikacije isključiva je odgovornost autora i ne odražava nužno stavove Helsinškog odbora za ljudska prava u Srbiji i Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Norveške (NMFA), niti partnera konzorcijuma SMART Balkan.



SADRŽAJ

Ako ljudsku i nacionalnu bezbednost nije moguće pomiriti koja od njih ima prednost?

Slovenačka manjina u Srbiji: između identiteta i nevidljivosti

Jugoslavija- početak i kraj jedne bajke

Civilno društvo na marginama ratnih komemoracija

Energetska bezbednost Srbije – izbor između usaglašavanja sa evropskim energetske okvire i oslanjanja na postojeće tokove

The Transatlantic Bargain in Crisis: US-European Foreign Policy Analysis in 2025

Odnos EU sa SAD, Rusijom I Kinom

Ako ljudsku i nacionalnu bezbednost nije moguće pomiriti koja od njih ima prednost? Zašto?

Autor: *Jovana Šeremetović*

Koristeći tradicionalno realističku paradigmu bezbednost je u centar svog istraživanja stavljala je samo probleme održanja teritorijalnog integriteta i suvereniteta države, kao ključnog preduslova stabilnosti. Nakon Hladnog rata, i pojavom koncepta ljudske bezbednosti dolazi do značajnog proširenja u kome u prvi plan dolazi do zaštite pojedinca od unutrašnjih pretnji i njegovih osnovnih potreba: fizička sigurnost, ekonomski i zdravstveni opstanak, politička prava i društvena stabilnost (kako je u izveštaju programa UNDPa ljudska bezbednost predstavljena). Ovim se otvara pitanje prioriteta između bezbednosti države i bezbednosti pojedinca. Neki autori zadržavaju državu

kao centralnog aktera (poput Beri Buzana u svom delu *People, states and fear* 1983.- iako identifikuje pet sektora bezbednosti. Dok drugi autori, poput Ronalda Parisa (2001) i Olea Weavera koristeći tezu ljudske bezbednosti naglašavaju značaj osnovnih potreba i prava pojedinaca, čak i kada to dolazi do konflikta sa nacionalnom bezbednošću. Baš iz tog razloga što se nacionalna bezbednost često koristi kao paravan za zanemarivanje individualnih prava, naročito u autoritarnim režimima. Kroz teorijsko-istorijski deo rada prikazaću razvoj koncepta ljudske bezbednosti, ističući njegovu razliku u odnosu na tradicionalno shvatanje bezbednosti i ukazujući na ulogu državnih institucija u njegovom ostvarivanju. Međutim, stabilne i funkcionalne institucije često su rezultat već postignutog mira i dugoročnog političkog razvoja. Zato ću kroz empirijske primere genocida u Ruandi i intervencije u Libiji, pokazati kako prisustvo odlučne međunarodne akcije može presudno uticati na ishod humanitarnih kriza, čime ljudska bezbednost dobija primat nad državnim suverenitetom.

Istorijski koncept ljudske bezbednosti može se posmatrati kroz njegov teorijski razvoj. Na početku imamo sam razvoj bezbednosti- u okviru koncepta

nacionalne bezbednosti, gde se akcent stavlja na državu kao glavnog subjekta. U klasičnim neorealističkim shvatanjima država je glavni objekat bezbednosti, jer obezbeđuje okvir u kome se stvaraju mehanizmi koji omogućavaju i ljudske bezbednosti. Kao važan oslonac ovog shvatanja ističe se Tomas Hobs koji veruje da „bez vlasti i zakona ljudi žive u stanju rata svih protiv svih“ zato on na koncept bezbednosti gleda kao „zaštitu od fizičkih nasilja i haosa, a tek posle dolazi blagostanje“. Ovakva i slična ali liberalnija stanovišta poput onih kod Loka, Rusoa, Bentama, Mila iako teorijsko različita i dalje kao centralni pojam bezbednosti vide državu.“ Paralelno sa tim, Evropske nacionalne države sve više se bave pravima ne samo svojih građana već i građana drugih država. Na Bečkom kongresu 1815. ukinuto je ropstvo u Evropi a tokom 19. veka počinje da se razvija humanitarno pravo“ (Ejdus, 2024 str.257) Veći zaokret ka stvaranju ljudske bezbednosti vidimo tek nakon Hladnog rata. Njenim začetnikom se može smatrati Mahbub ul Haq pakistanski ekonomista i glavni arhitekta već pomenutog UNDP Human Development Reporta iz 1994. Stvoren je novi međunarodni okvir u kome je zaštita života, dostojanstva i osnovnih sloboda postala univerzalna vrednost. Koren ove ideje se nalazi i u

političkom činu, naime 1941 godine. u govoru „četiri slobode“ Frenklina D. Ruzevelta koji pominje slobodu od straha i slobodu želje. Period koji dolazi je bio ispunjen duhom dekolonizacije, stvaranjem novih država, potom i konstituisanje njihovog unutrašnjeg uređenja- što dovodi do povećanih humanitarnih izazova.

Ovakav istorijski tok razvoja bezbednosti je doveo do rasprave o njenim pristupima . Rasprava se vodila između ljudske i nacionalne bezbednosti, od kojih jedna naglašava pojedinca kao ključnog objekata i druga koja posmatra državu kao glavni objekat bezbednosti, jer obezbeđuje okvir u kome se stvaraju mehanizmi koji omogućavaju postizanja ljudske bezbednosti. Zato jedan od predstavnika Kopenhaške škole Buzan navodi da „u odsustvu države, i društva i pojedinci postaju znatno ranjiviji, jer nema centralnog autoriteta koji može da se suprotstavi organizovanoj pretnji.“ (Buzan, 1991 str. 39). Prema Wolfersu nacionalna vrednost je pragmatičan uslov za funkcionisanje države. Iako on sam upozorava na dvosmislenost nacionalne bezbednosti veruje „da bez minimalnog stepena državne sigurnosti, ni jedna politika zaštite ljudskih prava ne može biti dosledno sprovedena.“(Wolfers, 1952 str.458) Dok David Chandler daje oštru kritiku ljudske bezbednosti kao

suviše apstraktno i ideološki obojeno shvatanje i tvrdi da se njime „legitimišu intervencije koje podrivaju suverenitet država i otvaraju vrata za selektivnu upotrebu sile.“ (Chandle, 2008 str. 79) Sa suprotne strane u korist ljudske bezbednosti pojavljuje se Velšku škola, još pre završetka Hladnog rata. „Predstavnik je Ken But koji želi da redefiniše pojam bezbednosti u pravcu emancipacije ljudi. Po mišljenju ove škole država je nezasluženo u centralnom delu. Smatraju da se time prekrivaju neuspesi moderne države da zaštiti pojedinca. Podsećaju da država ne treba da predstavlja cilj jedne bezbednosne politike već njenu instituciju.“ (Ejdus, 2024 str. 105)

U kasnijem periodu mnogi teoretičari staju na stranu ovog shvatanja, među njima je i Ronald Paris. Koji navodi da „ovaj koncept uključuje zaštitu od širokog spektara pretnji- ne samo oružanih sukoba, već i siromaštva bolesti, političke represije i ekoloških katastrofa.“ (Paris, 2001 str. 88) On takođe smatra da ideja ljudske bezbednosti pružaju mogućnost „refokusiranja pažnje međunarodnih aktera sa apstraktnih interesa države na konkretne potrebe ljudi.“ (Paris, 2001 str.88) Ovakvo shvatanje potkrepljuje i Sorensen koji ističe da je prava funkcija

bezbednosti „oslobađanje ljudi od straha i potrebe, a ne samo zaštita teritorijalnog integriteta.“ (Sorensen, 1990 str.440) Na posletku važno je pomenuti i Amartya Sena i njegov „pristup sposobnostima“ koji primenjuje i na koncept bezbednosti veruje da se ona ne temelji samo na fizičkoj bezbednosti, već i mogućnost da ljudi vode dostojanstven život. (Sen, 2000 str. 14) Neorealistički argumenti jasno dokazuju da se bez stabilne države ne može postići odgovarajući institucionalni okvir za zaštitu pojedinca. Ali Sorensen i Paris proširuju to shvatanje upućivanjem kritike da se bezbednost ne može samo puko fokusirati na zaštitu granica, već se moraju uzimati u obzir problemi pojedinaca. Zato ljudska bezbednost daje mogućnosti da se pitanje bezbednosti sagleda u širem kontekstu.

Za potpunije razumevanje ljudske bezbednosti potrebno je sagledati ne samo teorijsku, već i empirijsku ravan. Stvarna delatnost ovog koncepta se oslanja na mnogobrojne primere međunarodnih aktera čije reakcije kako u kritičnim tako i u svakodnevnim situacijama ukazuju na mogućnosti ljudske bezbednosti. Naime, pored međunarodnih organizacija i nevladinih organizacija, značajnu ulogu mogu imati i pojedine države. To dokazuju primeri Japana i Austrije koji, iako u

svojim spoljnim politikama promiču ideju ljudske bezbednosti, ljudsku bezbednost shvataju na različite načine. Dok Japan zastupa šire shvatanje bezbednosti koje obuhvata sveukupan razvoj, Austrija između ostalog sužava pojam ljudske bezbednosti na "slobodu od straha" (Ejdus 2024, 260-261). Čini se pak da akcenat treba biti na praktičnim rezultatima ostvarenim kroz napore (ovih) država. Među doprinosima se ističu Fond i Komisija za ljudsku bezbednost, lobiranje za uspostavljanje Međunarodnog krivičnog suda i inicijativa za uspostavljanje Međunarodne komisije o intervenciji i državnom suverenitetu čiji je izveštaj odgovornosti za zaštitu right to protect (R2P) dodatno razradio poimanje ljudske bezbednosti (Ejdus 2024, 260- 265). Iako nacionalni sistemi mogu biti vrlo značajni za svakodnevnu zaštitu građana, one se većinom razvijaju u relativno stabilnim državnim uređenjima. Ipak postoje situacije u kojima ovakve institucije i mehanizmi još uvek nisu razvijeni, a upravo takvi slučajevi pokazuju važnost stavljanja ljudske bezbednosti u prvi plan. Primer Genocida u Ruandi jedan je od graničnih primera u kome je nedostajala brza i odlučna reakcija međunarodnih organizacija. Tokom ovog tragičnog događaja ubijeno je za svega 100 dana oko 900.000 ljudi, uglavnom pripadnici naroda

Tutsi. I pored prisutnosti misija Ujedinjenih nacija (UNAMIR) njihovo delovanje je bilo ograničeno samo na posmatranje, bez mogućnosti upotrebe sile radi zaštite civila. Sam komandat misije je više puta tražio od Saveta bezbednosti da mu prošire ovlašćenja, upozoravajući na mogući zločin, ali bez uspeha. Na ovom događaju primećujemo ograničenja nacionalne bezbednosti. Država Ruanda je funkcionisala kao suverena politička zajednica, ali u ovom slučaju ne samo da nije zaštitila prava svojih građana, već je i direktno sprovedila zločin protiv njih. Time potvrđujemo da „država koja zanemaruje sigurnost svojih građana ne može očekivati stabilnost...” (Sorensen, 1990 str. 445) Zbog ovoga genocid u Ruandi predstavlja prekretnicu, koja je doprinela redefinisaju pojma suverenitet kao: Odgovornost države da štiti svoje građane. I kasnije je razvijen koncept „odgovornosti za zaštitu“- (responsibility to protect R2P). Koji zastupa da međunarodna zajednica ima pravo, ali i obavezu da interveniše u slučajevima genocida, etničkog čišćenja, zločina protiv čovečnosti i ratnih zločina, kada to država ne želi ili ne može da učini. Važnu ulogu u definisanju ovog stava prema „odgovornosti“ imao je Kofi Anan, koji je nakon genocida u Ruandi u više govora izrazio osećaj lične i institucionalne odgovornosti

za „reakciju“ međunarodne zajednice. Čak i David Chendler koji je kritičan prema konceptu ljudske bezbednosti, smatra da se suverenitet države shvata kao „problematična i nelegitimna ukoliko ne sadrži minimum zaštite za svoje građane.“

Na primeru Libije predstaviću relativno uspešno korišćenje R2P. Gde 2011. za vreme arapskog proleća izbijaju masovni protesti protiv Gadafija, režim na to odgovara korišćenjem brutalne sile. Gadafi je javno pretio „Mi dolazimo večeras. Spremite se od večeras. Naćićemo vas u vašim ormarima.“(Gaddafi's speech, 2011) Savet bezbednosti je na ovo reagovao usvajanjem Rezolucije 1973 kojom je omogućena upotreba svih neophodnih sredstava za zaštitu civila- ova intervencija se oslanja na R2P koji je formalno usvojen 2005. I ishod je bio, da je intervencijom uspešno sprečeno masovno krvoproliće u Bengaziju i Gadafijev sistem je srušen. Međutim Libija nije savršeni prikaz, jer nije uspostavljen dugoročni mir nakon intervencije, već se otvorio prostor za dalje nered. Ovaj primer pokazuje da i uprkos mnogim upućenim kritikama, pristup odgovornosti ostaje fundamentalni instrument u nastojanju da se unapredi zaštita i bezbednost ljudi. Da, savršeni mehanizam ne postoji, ali odsustvom ovog mehanizma i

ostalih koji spadaju u koncept ljudske bezbednosti, bi nas samo vratilo veliki korak u nazad i ponovo otvorilo vrata za prekobrojne zločine nad ljudskim stanovništvom pravdajući svoje postupke “državnom suverenošću”.

Jer kako ističe i Ronald Paris ovaj koncept iako ambiciozan, otvara prostor za legitimaciju intervencije koje su usmerene ka zaštiti ljudskih života, a ne očuvanju statusa kvo“ (Paris, 2001 str.90) Iako je koncept ljudske bezbednosti pretežno vezan za intervencije, pogotovo kroz ideju odgovornosti za zaštitu, bitno je napomenuti da u korist ove bezbednosti treba imati u vidu i šire političke i institucionalne probleme. Jer kako je objasnio Paris „ljudska bezbednost ne bi trebalo da se tretira kao alat za reagovanje u kriznim situacijama, već kao dugoročna strategija za prevenciju sukoba kroz jačanje državnih i društvenih kapaciteta”(Paris, 2001 str.92). Stoga bitno je podsticati mehanizme koji stvaraju uslove koji omogućavaju neki vid prevencije. Ovaj pristup se odnosi na izgradnju funkcionalnih institucija, jačanje političkih prava, socijalne ravnopravnosti, pristup obrazovanju čime se potiče dugoročnija stabilnost.

Koncept ljudske bezbednosti, i pored svojih teorijskih sporova i praktičnih izazova, predstavlja jedan od najvažnijih normativnih iskoraka međunarodne zajednice u savremenoj istoriji. Pomeranje fokusa sa interesa države ka konkretnim interesima pojedinca-koja nisu potpuna bez prava na život, dostojanstvo,.. Istorijski primeri poput Ruande i Libije pokazuju da potpuno odsustvo akcije može imati kobne posledice, ali i da organizovano delovanje međunarodnih organizacija može spasiti živote. Jer u sposobnosti da odgovori na pitanja osnovnih ljudskih prava leži moralna i politička moć ljudske bezbednosti. Ona ne pokušava da negira značaj stabilne države i njenih institucija, već ima želju da ih proširi, kroz prizmu ideje da je pojedinac centralni subjekat zaštite. Pa tako autori poput Parisa ili Sorensena nude mnoge korisne načine za reformisanje bezbednosnog sektora u skladu sa potrebama građana. Ne smemo zaboraviti činjenicu da se pojedinci u teškim životnim okolnostima ne mogu uvek sami izboriti za opstanak. Društvo i država ne smeju dozvoliti da oni ostanu zanemareni.

A napuštanjem ovog sistema ideja vratili bismo se u doba kada su masovni zločini bili pod kišobranom državnog suvereniteta. Stroga ljudska bezbednost mora

važiti kao primat savremene međunarodne politike- ne samo kao strategija u kriznim situacijama, nego mnogo više od odsustva rata a to je „život dostojan čoveka“.

Literatura:

Buzan, Barry People, States and Fear : The National Security Problem in International Relations. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983.

Wolfers, Arnold „National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol.” Political Science Quarterly 67, no.4 (December 1952): 481-502.

Paris, Ronald. International security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? 26 (2): 87-102, The MIT Press, 2001.

Chandler, David Human Security: „The dog that didn't bark” Security Dialogue 39, no.4 (August 2008): 427-438.

Sorensen, Theodore C. „Rethinking National Security” Foreign Affairs 69, no.3 (1990): 1-18

Ejdus, Filip. 2024. Međunarodna bezbednost: teorije, sektori i nivoi. Beograd: Clio.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security. Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press for UNDP.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2000. Human Development Report 2000: Human Rights and Human Development. New York: Oxford University Press for UNDP.

Sen, Amartya 2000. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf.

Slovenačka manjina u Srbiji: između identiteta i nevidljivosti

Autor: *Jovana Šeremetović*

Iako u Srbiji živi više od 9000 građana slovenačkog porekla koji imaju slovenačko državljanstvo i lične dokumente koje im je izdala njihova matična država. Popisom iz 2022. pokazalo se nažalost, da se kao pripadnici slovenačke manjine izjasnilo svega 2829. Slovenci u Srbiji su uglavnom koncentrirani u većim gradovima poput Beograda, Novog Sada, Subotice i Pančeva, iako kulturno nisu među većim manjinama slovenačka zajednica ima dugu tradiciju prisutnosti u Srbiji, posebno kroz kulturne događaje, ali i pojedince koji su ostavili traga u našoj državi.

Naseljavanja Slovenaca je počelo još u 18.veku kada su dolazili kao vojna ispomoć u borbi protiv Otomanske imperije. Dok već u 19. veku Slovenci kao put do stvaranja sopstvene države vide kroz uspostavljanje Kraljevstva SHS 1919. što oslikava citat dr. Antuna Korošca u razgovoru sa Mačekom: „ Vi morate razumeti i nas Slovence, mi nismo ništa izgubili, a vrlo mnogo smo dobili...”

Za vrijeme Austrije nismo imali niti jedne slovenske škole i službeni jezik nam je bio njemački, a danas imamo ne samo slovenske srednje škole nego i sveučilišta...”

Nakon II svetskog rata i entuzijazma o formiraju zajedničke države dolazi do masovnog naseljavanja Slovenaca na teritoriji Srbije, to su uglavnom bili ljudi bez zemlje, koji nisu mogli da se vrate u svoje razrušene domove posle rata, ali i ratni heroji. Tim Slovincima je bila obećana zemlja, kuća ili posao, što će se kasnije ispostaviti, mnogi nisu ni dobili. Dana 12. maja 1991. godine, kada je Slovenija zvanično odlučila da više ne želi biti članica SFRJ, svi Slovenci koji su živeli van te republike postali su dijaspora, što i danas utiče na to da se mnogi od njih ređe izjašnjavaju kao Slovenci na

popisima stanovništva.

I pored ovih dugovekovnih odnosa postoji (kao što smo već pomenuli) zabeležen sve manji i manji broj pripadnika ove manjine, za šta je odgovorno više faktora. Većina stanovnika slovenačkog porekla u Srbiji poseduje dvojno državljanstvo (srpsko i slovenačko). Međutim mnogi od njih smatraju da ukoliko se na popisu izraze kao Slovenci pod idejom da će na taj način izgubiti neka građanska prava i da će im biti ugrožena materijalna imovina koju su stekli. Još jedan razlog se nalazi u nestajanju samog slovenačkog identiteta kod osoba koje stupaju u mešovite brakove. I možda najporazniji razlog se krije u narativu da su Slovenci krivi za raspad bivše države. Čemu svedoče i slučajevi da se posle 30 godina od raspada SFRJ u svakodnevnoj komunikaciji domaćeg stanovništva provlače i pogrđni komentari.

Zbog ovakvih razloga Slovenska manjina smatra da su u savremenom društvu svedeni na statistički podatak: „Status svake zajednice zavisi od broja članova te zajednice. Slovenci su u zajedničkoj državi imali status konstitutivnog naroda, a sada su nacionalna manjina i to malobrojna.“ kaže Saša Verbič, predsednik Nacionalnog saveta slovenačke nacionalne manjine u Srbiji.

Iako se Slovenci u Srbiji retko suočavaju sa otvorenom diskriminacijom, i dalje je prisutno odsustvo šire društvene podrške i priznanja. Kako ističe članica udruženja iz Novog Sada: „Nismo diskriminirani, ali nismo ni uključeni. Ponekad imam utisak da se naše postojanje podrazumeva, ali se nikada ne vidi.“

Uprkos postojanju 17 aktivnih slovenačkih udruženja i škola jezika, i dalje nedostaju sadržaji koji bi povezali novu generaciju sa slovenačkim jezikom i kulturom. Slovenačka manjina u Srbiji predstavlja „kulturu koja se povlači“ – proces kulturne i jezičke asimilacije uzima maha, a slovenački jezik sve se ređe koristi u svakodnevnoj komunikaciji.

Možemo zaključiti da u Srbiji, gde se kulture različitih zajednica prepliću već vekovima, slovenačka manjina stoji između tihe asimilacije i nevidljivosti. Često sa osećajem zaboravljenosti – njen jezik bleđi, a tradicija se gubi među mladim generacijama. Kako je istakla profesorka u penziji sa Novosadskog univerziteta: „Deca ne znaju jezik, a bez jezika nema ni identiteta. Ako želimo da opstanemo kao zajednica, moramo uložiti više vremena u edukaciju i kulturne sadržaje”

Slično možemo razumeti i iz istraživanja Irene Kužnik: „Interesovanje za slovenački jezik, kao i potreba za profesorima i prevodiocima, naglo su porasli nakon raspada Jugoslavije i ulaska slovenačkih kompanija na srpsko tržište, ali slovenački i dalje opstaje samo kao strani jezik bez institucionalne prisutnosti u obrazovnom sistemu van univerzitetskih centara.“ (Đukanović u Kužnik, 2016: 164)

Iz ovih reči vidimo da slovenačka manjina ipak ima snage, ali i potencijala da uspeju u obnovi svog identiteta- posebno uz izraženu spremnost matične države Slovenije da podrži očuvanje jezika, ali i mnogobrojnih kulturnih događaja (kroz produkciju mnogih dokumentarnih filmova, izdavanje naučnog časopisa „Slovenika“, ali i časova slovenačkog jezika u nekoliko škola u Srbiji.)

zvori:

<https://slovinci.rs/>

Irena Kužnik „Jezici u kontaktu: status srpskog jezika u Sloveniji i slovenačkog jezika u Srbiji“ (2016.), filološki univerzitet u Beogradu

Josip Veber „Istorija Slovenije- seminarski rad“ (2018.), Pančevo

Jugoslavija- pocetak i kraj jedne bajke

Autor: *Vladimir Stanisavljev*

Nastanak Jugoslovenske ideje

Jugoslavija-zemlja koje više nema. U jednim negativne emocije, a drugima budi lepa osećanja. Ideja Jugoslovenstva je nastala polovinom 19.veka kada su pocela pozorišta iz Beograda i Zagreba da saraduju. Kulturna saradnja kroz pozorišni tetar je opstajala uprkos lošim odnosima Srbije i Austro-Ugarske. Jugoslovenska ideja je živelala i za vreme Kneza Mihaila, a i kasnije za vreme Kralja Petra I Karađorđevića. Tokom septembra meseca 1904. godine na svečanoj proslavi ustoličenja Kralja Petra I Karađorđevića je pored pozorišta iz Beograda, gostovalo i kazalište iz Zagreba.

Ideja jugoslovenstva je nastala kroz kulturnu saradnju Srba i Hrvata, a jedni od nosioca jugoslovenske ideje su bili Ivan Meštrović i Nadežda Petrović. Pominjanje ovih umetničkih giganata nam govori o tome da je Jugoslavija bila vizionarska ideja. Jugoslavija je bila velika ideja za male ljude. Sedam Ugarskih plemena je krajem 9. veka sa prostora južnog Urala došla u Panoniju i formirala mađarsku naciju. U čemu je bile prepreka da se stvori nacija od južnoslovenskih naroda?

Pristalica sam teorije da su nacije politička kategorija, produkt 19. veka i buržoaskih društva. Ukoliko je neka nacija organska kod južnoslovenskih naroda, onda je to jugoslovenska nacija. Uzmimo za primer Srbina, Hrvata i Bošnjaka iz Mostara, u čemu je razlika između njih? Sličniji su jedni drugima nego što su sličniji Srbini iz Beograda, Hrvatima iz Zagreba ili Bošnjaku iz Sarajeva. Možemo da uzmemo primer Srbina i Hrvata iz Dalmacije. Ne postoji suštinska razlika. Ista kultura, veoma slični običaji, ista genetika koju nauka potvrđuje, čak i ista religija. Jedina razlika između Srbina i Hrvata iz Dalmacije su različiti pravci unutar jedne religije.

Pva Jugoslavija

Kroz kulturnu saradnju južnoslovenskih naroda je nastala i politička saradnja. Nakon atentata u Sarajevu na Franca Ferdinanda od strane organizacije Mlada Bosna i Prvog svetskog rata gde je Srbija izgubila dve trećine muškog reproduktivnog stanovništva 01.12.1918. godine došlo je do stvaranja Kraljevina Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, a ubrzo je država preimovana u Kraljevinu Jugoslavija. Prva Jugoslavija je u početku bila demokratska, da bi posle nacionalnih trvenja između srpskih i hrvatskih političara došlo do atentata u skupštini od strane Puniše Račića na Stjepana Radića, posle toga je uvede šestojanuarska diktatura od strane Kralja Aleksandra. Prva Jugoslavija se sastojala od devet banovina. Banovine su nosile imena po geografskim toponimima. To je suštinski bila dobra ideja da na takav način započne građenje jugoslovenske nacije. Hrvatski nacionalisti i rimokatolička crkva su se bunili, jer su Srbi bili etnička većina u osam od devet banovina i optuživala Kralja Aleksandra da je prikriveni nacionalista i da želi veliku Srbiju. Napadi na Aleksandra nisu dolazili samo od rimoktoličke crkve, već i od Srpske pravoslavne crkve, kojoj nije odgovarala ideja

jugoslovenstva kao građanska ideje, jer u tom slučaju uticaj crkve u društvu opada.

Kralj Aleksandar je ubijen u Marselju 9. oktobra 1934. godine. Njega je ubio Vlado Georgijev Černozemski pripadnik VMRO-a i saradnik ustaškog pokreta Ante Pavelica. Tom prilikom je smrtno ranjen i francuski ministar spoljnih poslova Luj Bartu.

Prva Jugoslavija se našla u ozbiljnim problemima. Korupcija je cvetala, od ratnih profitera iz Prvog svetskog rata je stvorena buržoaska elita. Veliki broj ljudi je živio u siromaštvu ili na ivici siromaštva. Posle dvadesetsedmomartovskih demonstracija i šestoaprilskog bombardovanja Beograda, veći deo vojne i političke elite je napustio Jugoslaviju. U Jugoslaviji su postojala dva antifašistička pokreta. Jedan sastavljen od bivših oficira Kraljevine Jugoslavije predvođen generalom Mihailovićem, a drugi pokret je bio partizanski pokret, predvođen Josipom Brozom Titom.

Druga Jugoslavija

Okosnica partizanskog pokreta je bila Komunistička partija Jugoslavije. Nju su uglavnom činili mladi ljudi sa

uglavnom progresivnim idejama za to vreme. U početku su gledani od strane stanovništva kao jeretici, sve do formiranja druge Jugoslavije 29. novembra 1943. godine u Jajcu, gde je odlučeno da se ne obnovlja Kraljevina Jugoslavija i da se formira nova država sa šest ravnopravnih naroda i republika, kao i dve autonomne pokrajine. Druga Jugoslavije je istog datuma dve godine kasnije i zvanično osnovana i dobila ime Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija kada je zvanično ukinuta kraljevina. Tokom 1963. godine druga Jugoslavija je preimenovana u Socijalističku Federativnu Republiku Jugoslaviju (SFRJ).

Drugi svetski rat je doneo velike zločine od strane nacista i fašista na globalnom nivou kao što je holokaust nad Jevrejima, ali i na regionalnom nivou kao što su logori u Jasenovcu, Jadovnu, Gradiški, streljanje đaka u Kragujevcu. U tim zločinima je stradao veliki broj Srba, Jevreja, Roma i pripadnika drugih naroda koji su bili antifašisti.

Nakon Drugog svetskog rata je u Jugoslaviji su uvedeni preki sudovi. Veliki broj nedužnih ljudi je streljan na Lisičijem potoku, a formiran je logor na Golom otoku za političke neistomišljenike. Usledila je konfiskacija i

nacionalizacija imovine. Ovo je najtamnija strana druge Jugoslavije.

Pozitivne stvari su istorijsko "NE" Staljinu od strane Tita tokom 1948. godine i otvorenje Jugoslavije ka zapadu. Tito je imao talenat da prepozna istorijski trenutak. Veći deo sveta je počeo da se obnavlja i razvija nakon Drugog svetskog rata. Jugoslovenska diplomatija je doživela veliki uspeh 1961. godine formiranjem Pokreta nesvrstanih. Jugoslavija je bila predvodnik Pokreta, a Pokret je balansirao između zapadnog bloka predvođen SAD-om i istočnog bloka predvođen SSSR-om. Zahvaljujući Pokretu nesvrstanih mnoge afričke države su se oslobodila viševokovnog kolonijalnog uticaja.

Jugoslovenska privreda je počela da doživljava procvat zbog povratih i bespovratnih kredita od strane SAD-a, reorganizovanju privrede, kolektivizaciji imovine. Zahvaljujući društvenim preduzećima radnici u SFRJ su imali verovatno jedna od najvećih radničkih prava na svetu. Uvedene su mesne zajednice sa velikim ovlašćenjima, uveden je i samodoprinos. Zahvaljujući samodoprinosu su se izgradile mnoge škole, vrtići, domovi zdravlja, sportske hale, fudbalski tereni, pozorišta, bioskopi, dečija igralista i parkovi. Od kraja

Drugog svetskog rata, pa do 1980. godine u SFRJ je bila najveća društvena fluktuacija u Evropi. Tekovine socijalističke Jugoslavije su besplatno obrazovanje i zdravstvo, emancipacija žena, bolji položaj radničke klase, urbanizacija i pravljenje industrijskih regionalnih centara.

Međutim bilo je ljudi, prvenstveno mladih i obrzovanih, koji su drugačije mislili. Početkom juna 1968. godine izbile su masovne studentske demonstracije. One su se odvijale u Beogradu, Zagrebu, Ljubljani, Sarajevu, Skoplju, ali su najmasovnije bile u Beogradu. Studenti su bili nezadovoljni nepostojanjem demokratije, socijalnim raslojavanjem, lošim uslovima studiranja, lošim smestajem, korupcijom u društvu, birokratijom i privrednom reformom iz 1965. godine, koja je liberalizovala ekonomiju. Jugoslovenski studenti su tražili više socijalizma i pravednije društvo. Blokada fakulteta je trajala od 2. juna do 9. juna. Policija je u početku reagovala represivno, ali je policijsku represiju nad studentima prenela međunarodna štampa, pa je drug Tito rekao čuvenu rečenicu: "Studenti su u pravu". Jedni od vođa studentskog pokreta su bili Ljubomir Tadić, Nebojša Popov, Dragoljub Mićunović, Vojislav Koštunica.

Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije iz 1974. godine bio je najopsežniji i najdetaljniji ustav u jugoslovenskoj istoriji. Ovaj Ustav iz 1974. godine doneo je duboke promene u političkom i državnom uređenju.

Glavne odrednice Ustava iz 1974. godine su: 1. Decentralizacija države gde su šest republika (SR Slovenija, SR Hrvatska, SR Bosna i Hercegovina, SR Srbija, SR Crna Gora, SR Makedonija) dobile široka ovlašćenja, a dve pokrajine u Srbiji (SAP Vojvodina i SAP Kosovo) dobile status konstitutivnih elemenata federacije, skoro ravnopravan republikama. 2. Pravo na samopredljenje, gde je u preambuli Ustava stajalo da se narodi Jugoslavije udružuju "na osnovu prava na samoopredljenje, uključujući i pravo na otcepljenje". 3. Slabljenje saveznih organa gde su Saveznoj vladi i Skupštini smanjene nadležnosti, a republikama i pokrajinama su povećane nadležnosti. 4. Uvedeno je Predsedništvo SFRJ kao kolektivni organ, u kojem su bile zastupljene sve republike i pokrajine. 5. Josip Broz Tito je proglašen doživotnim predsednikom SFRJ.

Neki ljudi tada, a mnogi ljudi danas smatraju da je Ustav iz 1974. godine koji je dao najveći stepen autonomije republikama i pokrajinama, stvorio složen i slab savez, i

pripremio pravni teren za raspad Jugoslavije. Tog mišljenja je bio i profesor Pravnog fakulteta Univerziteta u Beogradu Mihailo Đurić. Profesor Đurić je izneo svoje stavove na jednom skupu u SANU, posle kojeg je bio optužen za "verbalni delikt" i "neprijateljsku propagandu". Osuđen je na dve godine zatvora. Istovremeno mu je i oduzeta profesura na Pravnom fakultetu. Kasnije je rehabilitovan i vratio se u akademski život.

Period nakon Titove smrti

Nakon Titove smrti 4. maja 1980. godine kolektivno predsedništvo je preuzelo funkciju šefa države, sa rotirajućim predsednikom svake godine. U martu 1981. godine su izbile studentske demonstracije na Kosovu. Kosovski studenti su bili nezadovoljni ekonomskom nerazvijenošću Kosova i visokom nezaposlenošću. Ubrzo su protesti iz socijalnih prešli u političke. Tražili su za Kosovo status republike i pravo na samoopredeljenje. Protesti su počeli u Prištini,

a kasnije su se proširili i na druge gradove na Kosovu. Jugslovensko rukovodstvo je represivnim merama suzbilo proteste. Upotrebljeni su milicija i JNA. Ovaj

dogadjaj je izazvao podelu u jugoslovenskom rukovodstvo. Jedni su smatrali da problem treba represijom da se reši, a drugi političkim putem. Spominje se da je desetak demonstiranja poginulo, a više stotina povređeno. Veliki broj demonstiranja je bio uhapšen. Ovakva represija nije rešila problem, već ga je "stavila po tepih", da bi problemi eskalirali krajem osamdesetih i tokom devedesetih godina dvadesetog veka.

Najveća prekretnica u raspadu Jugoslavije je bila Osma sednica CK Saveza komunista Srbije. Do Osme sednice predednik predesdištva CK Srbije je bio Ivan Stambolić. Stambolić se zalagao za očuvanje Jugoslavije i kompromis sa Albancima sa Kosova. Želeo je da se napravi kompromis sa Albancima gde bi oni sa jedne strane bili zadovoljni, a sa druge strane da se očuvaju elementarna prava i slobode Srba i Crnogoraca na Kosovu. Osma sednica je održana 23. i 24. septembra 1987. godine. U političkom sukubu sa Miloševićem se istakao Dragiša Pavlović, predsednik CK Beograda. Na toj sednici su smenjeni Stambolić, Pavlović i ostali komunisti koji su bili projugoslovenski orjentisani. Pobedila je Miloševićeva struja koja je protežirala

nacionalizam i represiju. To je bio trenutak gde su jugoslovenski narodi krenuli u propast "200 na sat".

Propast jugoslovenskih naroda, a pogotovo srpskog je bila 5. oktobra, ali ne 5 oktobra 2000. godine, već 5. oktobra 1988. godine. U Novom Sadu, a i u ostalim gradovima u Vojvodini je počela "Jogurt revolucija". Miloševićeve pristalice, uglavnom dovedene van Vojvodine su nasilnim putem smenile tadašnje legalno i legitimno pokrajinsko rukovodstvo. Pokrajinska vlada je gađana jogurtima i drugim mlečnim proizvodima. Od grada koji je bio simbol kulture je napravljeno ruglo. Miloševićev režim je tadašnje pokrajinsko rukovodstvo optužio za "nedostatak srpstva, odnarođenost i disfunkcionalnu birokratiju". Pokrajinsko rukovodstvo je podnelo ostavku, a Milošević je postavio svoje poslušnike na čelu Vojvodine. Ovaj događaj mu je bio vetar u leđa da izvede antibirokratske revojucije u Crnoj Gori i na Kosovu. Ubrzo je 1989. godine promenio Ustav, gde je pokrajinama drastično smanjio nadležnosti i centralizovao Srbiju. Promena Ustava iz 1989. godine je izazvala negodovanje kod drugih jugoslovenskih republike, pre svega Hrvatske i Slovenije.

Rat u Sloveniji

Prvi oružani sukob na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije je bio u Sloveniji, poznat kao "desetodnevni rat". Trajao je od 27. juna 1991. godine do 7. jula 1991. godine. Slovenija je pre toga imala referendum o nezavisnosti, gde se 88,5% stanovništva izjasnilo da je za nezavisnu Sloveniju. Srpsko rukovodstvo i JNA to nisu prihvatile, pa su oružano intervenisale. Tom prilikom je poginulo 44 pripadnika JNA, 19 Slovenaca (vojnika i civila), kao i nekoliko stranih novinara i vozača kamiona. JNA nije imala podršku lokalnog stanovništva, a sukobi su se nastavili u Hrvatskoj.

Rat u Hrvatskoj

Posle rata u Sloveniji, usledio je mnogo intenzivniji i krvaviji rat u Hrvatskoj. U Hrvatskoj se održao referendum, gde se većina građana Hrvatske izjasnila za nezavisnot. U tom trenutku je u Hrvatskoj živelo 580 000 Srba, uglavnom u Dalmaciji, Lici, Baniji i Slavoniji. Srpska manjina nije prihvatila novu hrvatsku vlast i proglasila je "SAO Krajinu". JNA se svrstala na stranu pobunjenih Srba i usledile su opsade Vukovara i Dubrovnika, Srpske snage su krajem 1991. godine

kontrolisale 1/3 Hrvatske. Prelomni trenutak se desio kada su hrvatske snage izvele operacije "Bljesak" i "Oluja" gde je veliki broj ljudi stradao. Izvršeno je etničko čišćenje i 200 000 Srba je proterano iz Hrvatske u Srbiji i Bosnu i Hercegovinu.

Tokom 1994./1995. godine se na stolu našao plan Z-4. To je bio međunarodni mirovni predlog, kako bi se rešio sukob između Republike Hrvatske i pobunjenih Srba. Autori planu su bili SAD, Rusija, Evropska unija i Ujedinjene nacije. Plan Z-4 je predlagao vrlo široku autonomiju za Srbe u Hrvatskoj, naročito u Krajini. Tim planom Srbi bi na 1/3 teritorije Republike Hrvatske imali parlament, vladu, predsednika, policiju, sudove, zastavu, himna, čak se i valuta spominjala. Srpski jezik i ćirilica bi bili u službenoj upotrebi. Hrvatskoj je bilo ponuđeno da zadrži kontrolu nad spoljnom politikom, odbranom, carinama i monetarnim sistemom. Hrvatska strana je prihvatila predlog kao osnov za pregovore, a lideri RSK Milan Martić i Milan Babić su odbili plan, jer su smatrali da se Srbima nudi nešto što su već osvojili. Režim iz Beograda i njegovi sateliti su "podgrevali" situaciju kako je pitanje dana kada će se RSK pripojiti Srbiji.

Hrvatska je priznata 15. 01.1992. godine od strane međunarodne zajednice, a Dejtonskim sporazumom se i zvanično završio rat u Hrvatskoj.

Rat u Bosni i Hercegovini

Posle krvavog rata, usledio je još krvaviji rat. Ovoga puta na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine. Bosna i Hercegovina je bila najkompleksnija republika u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Do rata u Bosni je živelo 44% Bošnjaka/Muslimana, 31% Srba i 17% Hrvata.

Nakon što su Slovenija i Hrvatska proglasila nezavisnost, Bošnjaci i Hrvati u Bosni su zatražili nezavisnost. Referendum o nezavisnosti BiH je održan 29. februara i 1. marta 1992 godine. Srbi su bojkotovali referendum. Od izašlih na referendum, 62,7% je glasalo za nezavisnost.

Usledio je najkrvaviji građanski rat na ovim prostorima gde su glavni akteri bili Armija Republike BiH, Vojska Republike Srpske i Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane. Sve tri strane su ratovala međusobno. Hrvati i Bošnjaci su vodili rat u srednjoj Bosni, gde je bilo ratnih zločina na obe strane. Vašingtonskim sporazumom, Bošnjaci i Hrvati su prekinuli sukobe i formirali Federaciju BiH.

Vojska Republike Srpske je u aprilu 1992. godine izvršila opsadu Sarajeva i takvo stanje je trajalo skoro 4 godine. To je bila najduža opsada u modernoj evropskoj istoriji. Vojska Republike Srpske je u tom trenutku kontrolisala oko 70% teritorije Bosne i Hercegovine.

Na pravoslavni Božić 7. januara 1993. godine u Kravici je izvršen masakr nad srpskim stanovništvom od strane Armije Bosne i Hercegovine. Ovaj masakr se koristio za agresivnu propagandu pojedinih srpskih političkih lidera, da bi kulminiralo masovnim zločinom u Srebrenici u julu 1995. godine. Srebrenica je bila proglašena od strane Ujedinjenih nacija za "zaštićenu zonu". Od strane Međunarodnog krivičnog suda za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY) i Međunarodnog suda pravde (ICJ) masakr u Srebrenici je međunarodno okarakterisan kao genocid u kojem je stradalo više od 8 000 Bošnjaka. Ratko Mladić, komandant Vojske Republike Srpske i Radovan Karadžić, politički lider Republike Srpske su osuđeni na doživotne kazne zatvora.

U Dejtonu (SAD) 21. novembra 1995. godine postignut je mirovni sporazum, a potpisan je u Parizu 14. decembra iste godine. Dejtonski sporazum je priznao Bosnu i Hercegovinu kao nezavisnu državu, sastavljenu

od dva entiteta: Federaciju BiH gde uglavnom žive Bošnjaci i Hrvati i Republiku Srpsku gde uglavnom žive Srbi. Ova tri naroda su konstitutivni narodi u Bosni i Hercegovini. Bosna i Hercegovina dva entiteta i tri konstitutivna narodna, ima kompleksnu situaciju sa kantonima, distriktom Brčko, pravosuđem, ustavnim nadležnostima. Tokom građanskog rata na području Bosne i Hercegovine je poginulo oko 100 000 ljudi (većinom civila), a oko 2 miliona ljudi je raseljeno.

Rat na Kosovu

Na Kosovu 1998. godine OVK je pokrenula oružani sukob protiv srpskih bezbednosnih snaga. Tokom 1998. godine i 1999. godine dolazi do eskalacije sukoba. JNA i srpske bezbednosne snage su sprovele vojne operacije. U martu 1999. godine NATO je započeo bombardovanje Jugoslavije bez odobrenja Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija. Milošević je u junu 1999. godine prihvatio sporazum u Rambujeu i povukao vojsku sa Kosova. Na Kosovu i Metohiji se desio napad na Srbe 17.03.2004. godine u kojem je raseljeno između 4 000- 4 500 lica. Pored Srba stradale su i drugo nealbansko stanovništvo. Napadi su uključivali paljenje kuća i crkava, uništavanje imovine, fizičke napade na civile.

Uništeno je više od 30 crkava i manastira, uključujući značajne kulturne spomenike Srpske pravoslavne crkve. Režim u Beogradu je odbijao kompromis od strane međunarodne zajednice. Odbijen je Ahtisarijev plan "Više od autonomije-manje od nezavisnosti". Albanske vlasti su na Kosovu pravile paralelne institucije i 17. februara 2008. godine proglasila jednostranu nezavisnost Kosova. Veći deo zemalja zapadnog sveta je priznao Kosovo kao nezavisnu državu. Prvenstveno SAD, Velika Britanija, Francuska, Nemačka, Italija. Kosovo nisu priznale Srbija, Rusija, Kina, pet o zemalja Evropske unije - Španija, Grčka, Kipar, Rumunija i Slovačka i još oko polovine zemalja koje su članice Ujedinjenih nacija, uglavnom isotčnih zemalja. Ratnih zločina je bilo sa obe strane, a Haški tribunal ih je procesuirao.

Epilog Jugoslavije i ratova devedesetih su krvavi građanski ratovi na prostoru Hrvatske, Bosne, Kosova i Slovenije. Jedino su Severna Makedonija i Crna Gora mirno napustile Jugoslaviju. Građanski ratovi na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije su prouzrokovali 130 000 mrtvih, više od 4 miliona raseljenih i izbeglih, a desetine hiljada nestalih, silovanih i traumatizovanih.

Danas su Slovenija i Hrvatska članice Evropske unije i NATO pakta. Crna Gora i Severna Makedonija su članice NATO pakta i imaju status kandidata za članstvo u EU. Bosna i Hercegovina se suočava sa dubokom političkom krizom i disfunkcionalnim državnim uređenjem, Kosovo nije član Ujedinjenih nacija, a Srbija ima status kandidata za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji i najviši stepen saradnje sa NATO paktom kroz Partnerstvo za mir, ali i velike unutrašnje probleme.

SR Jugoslavija (Srbija i Crna Gora) je tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka pod režimom Slobodana Miloševića bila izbačena iz Ujedinjenih nacija, Saveta Evrope i ostalih međunarodnih institucija. Naša zemlja je doživela sankcije, hiperinflaciju, pljačku preko piramidalne štednje, sveopšte siromaštvo, ekspanziju kriminala, korupcije, prostakluka i urušavanje sistema društvenih vrednosti. To je politička zaostavština Slobodana Miloševića. Da je do ljudi Jugoslavija bi bila najlepša bajka, ali pošto je bilo do zločinaca, Jugoslavija se pretvorila u krvavu bajku. Tekst ću završiti citatom poslednjeg predsednika predsedništva SFRJ, Ante Matkovića: "Zablude ćemo plaćati siromaštvom, trovanjem duha i položajem daleke periferije u Evropi. "

Civilno društvo na marginama ratnih komemoracija

Autor: *Jovana Šeremetović*

Komemoracije ne govore samo o prošlosti – one oblikuju i budućnost. A budućnost u postkonfliktnim društvima zavisi upravo od toga šta biramo da pamtimo, a šta da zaboravimo. Danas, svega tri decenije nakon ratova na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, mnoge civilne žrtve su izgubile i po drugi put – ne samo život, već i mesto u kolektivnom pamćenju. Komemoracije koje o njima ćute postaju produžetak konflikta, a ne njegovo prevazilaženje. Kada se godišnjice obeležavaju istim govorima, kada novinski naslovi liče jedni na druge, i kada nas potresu suze samo "naših", tada komemoracije prestaju da budu čin saosećanja – i postaju spektakl. U postjugoslovenskim društvima, civilne žrtve "druge strane" postale su simbol nepoželjne istine: da patnja

nije pripadala samo jednom narodu, jednoj vojsci, jednoj strani. Ta istina je preteška za mnoge nacionalne narative, pa se potiskuje, prećutkuje, briše. Zaborav postaje zvanična politika, a politika pamćenja – produženi rat drugim sredstvima.

Upravo zato je važno podsetiti da sećanje na civilne žrtve nije samo pitanje morala – već i pitanje međunarodnog prava. Prema Ženevskim konvencijama i njihovim dopunskim protokolima, civilno stanovništvo ima pravo na zaštitu tokom oružanih sukoba, a žrtve na priznavanje i dostojanstveno sećanje. U kontekstu postkonfliktnih društava, ta se pravna osnova zamenjuju različitim simboličkim selekcijama.

Bez obzira na različitosti tragedija kao što su Srebrenica, Oluja ili Jasenovac, iza statistika stoji neizmerna ljudska patnja – porodice rastrgnute gubitkom, zajednice razorene do temelja. Uprkos tome, dominantni narativi uglavnom ističu samo žrtve "svoje" strane, dok se patnja ostalih marginalizuje ili potpuno ignoriše. Ovakav pristup ne samo da ne donosi utehu onima koji su izgubili bližnje, već blokira i istinsko pomirenje. Sociološko shvatanje Dubravke Ugrešić podseća da „u društvima u kojima se patnja drugog ne priznaje, ni

sopstvena ne može biti potpuno izlečena“ . U suprotnom, memorija postaje sredstvo isključivanja, a ne zajedništva. Istoričar Eric Gordy ističe da „selektivni zaborav nije pasivno zaboravljanje, već aktivni proces političke kontrole nad prošlošću, kojim se oblikuju nacionalni identiteti i odnosi moći“ . Takva politizacija pamćenja održava podele i sprečava trajni mir. Poseban uticaj na oblikovanje kolektivnog sećanja imaju mediji koji ne samo da izveštavaju, već i biraju koje će žrtve istaći, a koje zanemariti. Gordy navodi da „mediji služe kao mehanizmi selektivnog pamćenja, koji aktivno oblikuju nacionalni identitet i služe za politiku zaborava“ (Gordy, 2004, str. 73). Ovo se jasno vidi u načinu na koji se izveštava o godišnjicama Srebrenice ili Oluje, gde su narativi često jednostrani i emotivno usmereni.

Isto tako, obrazovni sistemi u regionu često reprodukuju i učvršćuju ove selektivne narative. Srđan Vučetić primećuje da „školski udžbenici i nastavni programi često isključuju perspektive ‘drugih’, stvarajući tako fragmentirano i konfliktno kolektivno pamćenje“ (Vučetić, 2017, str. 112). Mladim generacijama pruža se nepotpuna, a ponekad i iskrivljena slika prošlosti, što dodatno pojačava

polarizaciju. Fond za humanitarno pravo upozorava da obrazovni programi često zanemaruju patnju civilnih žrtava svih strana. (Fond za humanitarno pravo, 2015.)

Sećanje na ratne žrtve često se koristi i kao sredstvo političke i ekonomske dominacije. Gordy navodi da je „sećanje postalo alat političke moći i ekonomske koristi, gde se patnja koristi za legitimitet i kontrolu“ (Gordy, 2004, str. 98). Uprkos tome, postoje brojni primeri angažmana nevladinih organizacija i pojedinaca koji kroz alternativne komemoracije i programe promovišu univerzalno priznavanje patnje i pravdu za sve žrtve, bez obzira na pripadnost. Organizacije poput Žena u crnom i Inicijative mladih za ljudska prava neumorno rade na izgradnji mostova razumevanja i empatije, prevazilazeći uske nacionalne narative i nudeći drugačiji model pamćenja (Žene u crnom, 2018; Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava, 2020). Njihov rad pokazuje da politika pamćenja može biti oslobođena sukoba i koristiti se kao instrument pomirenja i trajnog mira.

Giorgio Agambenova ideja o „golom životu“ (bare life) dobija posebno značenje kada govorimo o civilnim žrtvama koje društvo još nije u potpunosti prepoznalo. One postaju simbol životne politike koja, umesto da ih

isključiti, može postati podstrek za širu inkluziju u zajedničko priznavanje. Ova perspektiva nas poziva na važna pitanja: „Kako da uključimo one koje još nismo pomenuli?“ i „Kako graditi pomirenje koje je zaista ravnopravno?“ Komemoracije imaju moć ne samo da čuvaju sećanje, već i da oblikuju svest i vrednosti mladih generacija. Ukoliko se

kroz njih prenosi otvoreno pamćenje, one mogu postati temelj za izgradnju društva koje neguje mir, razumevanje i poštovanje prema svim žrtvama. Time se mladima pruža šansa da razviju širi i saosećajni pogled na prošlost i sadašnjost. Misao Mahatme Gandija kojim možemo završiti tekst: „Nacija koja zaboravlja svoju prošlost nema budućnost.“ Bez hrabrosti da pogledamo u oči svim dimenzijama svoje istorije, bez spremnosti da uvrstimo u zajedničko sećanje i one čija patnja ne odgovara dominantnim narativima, osuđeni smo da ponavljamo iste greške i da ostanemo zarobljeni u trajnom sukobu. Tek kada se sećanje oslobodi uskih političkih interesa, otvara se prostor za pravuempatiju, pravdu i mogućnost zajedničkog života. Samo kroz iskreno sećanje možemo započeti put ka društvu koje neće zaboraviti nijednu žrtvu, niti ignorisati nijedan gubitak.

Literatura:

Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Fond za humanitarno pravo. Izveštaj o obrazovnim politikama i suočavanju sa prošlošću. Beograd: FHP, 2015. Pristupljeno 15. jun 2025. <https://www.hlc-rdc.org>.

Gandhi, Mahatma. The Words of Gandhi. Edited by Richard A. Tattenborough. New York: Newmarket Press, 1982.

Gordy, Eric D. The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives.

University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.

Inicijativa mladih za ljudska prava. Zajednička sećanja: prakse i politike. Beograd: Inicijativa, 2020.

Ugrešić, Dubravka. Kultura laži. Beograd: Fabrika knjiga, 2011.

Vučetić, Srđan. „Obrazovanje, istorija i nacionalni identitet u postjugoslovenskim društvima.“ U

Zbornik o obrazovanju i sećanju, uredila Jelena Đorđević, 109–124. Beograd: Helsinški odbor za

ljudska prava, 2017.

Žene u crnom. Komemorativne prakse i odgovornost za zločine. Beograd: Žene u crnom, 2018.

Energetska bezbednost Srbije – izbor između usaglašavanja sa evropskim energetske okvire i oslanjanja na postojeće tokove

Autor: *Dunja Trifunović*

Tamo gde evroskeptični Evropljani i oni u zemljama koje zbog nerešenih unutrašnjih pitanja još tavoru u pristupnim pregovorima umišljaju lukavstva Zapada nalazi se zlatna žica ekonomske stabilnosti, ali i bezbednosnog povezivanja. Podunavskog regiona. Zašto najradikalniji elementi u Evropi koji buddistico vide u Evroazijskom savezu kritikuju inicijative koje integrišu region Zapadnog Balkana, nazivajući ih novim Drang nah ostenom, uzgred, spremni da trampe blagostanje nizašto? Ne treba tragati za skrivenim dokazima ili istorijskim predrasudama. Reč je o dve kategorije ljudi –

jedna vešto konvertuje znanje u propagandu, a druga sledi „umnije glave“ svoje nacionalističke struje ne bi li potvrdila svoju naklonost Rusiji. U oba slučaja – remetilački faktori, bar kada je reč o Srbiji, svojim delovanjem ne samo da šire dezinformacije i učvršćuju evroskeptike u pogrešnom uverenju da im Zapad „radi o glavi“, već imaju i destabilizirajuću ulogu, budući da se svaki potez vlasti kao nosioca suvereniteta naroda meri potezima koji idu u pravcu evrointegracija.

Dunavska strategija vs. Turski tok

Ključan primer odnosi se na energetske integracije koje se sprovode u okviru izgradnje gasnih i energetskih interkonektora. Sjajna vest za Srbiju, budući da Akcioni plan Dunavske strategije EU iz 2010, podrazumeva stvaranje elektroenergetskih mreža između Rumunije i Bugarske, Rumunije i Moldavije, Mađarske i Hrvatske, Mađarske i Rumunije, te Austrije i Mađarske. U tom kontekstu ministri energetike Srbije i Rumunije, Dubravka Đedović Handanović i Sebastijan Burduž potpisali su 5. avgusta 2025, u Kladovu, Memorandum o razumevanju o izgradnji gasnog interkonektora Srbija–Rumunija. To, da umrežavanje regiona u

jednu energetska šemu predstavlja značajan korak ka oslobađanju od energetske zavisnosti Rusije – niko ne krije. Četrnaest zemalja i 115 miliona ljudi bili bi energetska zbrinuti u okviru plana Dunavske strategije. Ipak, ova dobra vest uznemirava mnoge duhove na Balkanu koji su spremni da tvrde da ovde nije reč o ekonomskim benefitima, već NATO zamci.

Tragom kojih referenci oni izvlače ovakve zaključke? Kao što je napomenuto, niko ne spori da energetika jeste i geopolitičko pitanje par ekselans. Takođe, teško je osporiti činjenicu da je Rusija nakon invazije na Krim, okupiranja delova Ukrajine i

stalnih provokacija na granici Belorusije i Poljske – mogla vojno da zakorači na evropsko tlo. U okolnostima energetske zavisnosti, čak i zemlje koje su tek na putu predpristupnih pregovora – teško da bi mogle da biraju svoju stranu istorije. Ona bi bila nametnuta. Otuda Dunavska strategija jasno definiše i svoje ciljeve u geopolitičkim projekcijama. Bečka Dunavska deklaracija, koju su jednoglasno podržale sve članice Dunavske strategije, uključujući Srbiju, u fokus stavlja i agresiju i rat protiv Rusije. Zašto onda kritičari evrointegracija pronalaze skriveni smisao u potpisanim dokumentima,

suprotstavljajući ideju Dunavske strategije Turskom toku?

Reč je naravno, o upotrebi činjenica. U ovom osvrtu na značaj energetske povezivanja neću se služiti statistikama i ekonomskim podacima koji su dostupni u svim javnim izveštajima, a koji svedoče da u okolnostima rata i stvaranja antiruske koalicije nema prostora za gasne aranžmane sa zemljom koja pretenduje da pokori i Stari kontinent. Činjenice su neoborive. Srbija u novim geopolitičkim konstelacijama nema više taj luksuz da promoviše četiri stuba spoljne politike. Između Evrope kojoj geografski pripada i Rusije za koju je drži deo biračkog tela – izbor nije teško načiniti. Za one nedovoljno obaveštene trebalo bi ideju energetske integracije „stripovati“ i u zaključcima pojednostaviti: umrežavanjem sa Rumunijom, Bugarskom, te dalje s Moldavijom i Austrijom Srbija dobija, ne samo sigurne energetske izvore već i geopolitičku samostalnost da donosi odluke u skladu sa interesima njenih građana. Skeptike koji u traganju za mestom u EU prepoznaju NATO zamku takođe treba suočiti s faktima. Želite Turski tok? Vrata su širom otvorena, samo „nacrtajte“ kako ste zamislili realizaciju i objasnite istomišljenicima cenu izbora.

The Transatlantic Bargain in Crisis: US-European Foreign Policy Analysis in 2025

Autor: *Al Mikono Čopič*

Preface

This article examines a volatile and rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape where transatlantic relations are in unprecedented flux. Policies shift within weeks, and what appears stable today may be outdated tomorrow. NATO consultations, European economic disputes, and US domestic politics all change faster than analysis can keep pace. The purpose here is not to predict exact outcomes, but to capture the structural forces shaping them.

The most recent escalation underscores this volatility. In September 2025, Poland and Estonia invoked NATO's Article 4 after Russian drones crossed their airspace. The consultations highlighted both the alliance's formal solidarity and its fragile credibility: Eastern allies viewed the incident as existential, while Washington downplayed it as another burden. This divergence reflects the core theme of this analysis: a transatlantic bargain under strain, caught between US retrenchment and European fragmentation.[1][2][3]

Introduction

Since 1949, the transatlantic alliance has underpinned Western security through an implicit bargain: the US provided nuclear deterrence and security guarantees while Europe aligned strategically and economically. This arrangement was never equal, but it was durable. Today, however, it is fraying at both ends.

The central puzzle emerges from conflicting trends: Is America entering a new age of isolationism, or merely reprioritizing toward Asia? Can Europe fill the gap left by US retrenchment, or will internal divisions prevent effective action? How does Russia exploit these cracks

systematically? And what role do smaller theaters like the Balkans play in testing Western credibility?

This analysis addresses these questions through five interconnected perspectives: the American experience of retrenchment and conditional engagement; the

European struggle between strategic autonomy and internal fragmentation; Russia's opportunistic exploitation of Western divisions; the Balkans as a bellwether of broader Western credibility; and Ukraine as the central test case where all dynamics converge.

The thesis advanced here is that the US is shifting toward transactional retrenchment—maintaining military capacity while reducing political commitment—while Europe pursues uneven autonomy— aspiring to independence but lacking the cohesion to achieve it. This creates a cycle of reciprocal weakness: American disengagement justifies European disunity, which reinforces American claims of Allied dependency. Russia exploits this cycle systematically, pressuring Ukraine and destabilizing the Balkans. Ultimately, Ukraine serves as the fulcrum on which transatlantic credibility rests.

Section I: The American Perspective – From Leadership to Conditional Engagement

From Global Guarantor to Transactional Partner

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 declared that the United States "must support free peoples resisting attempted subjugation." This ethos of global leadership and unconditional security guarantees defined American foreign policy for seven decades. NATO embodied this commitment through Article 5's promise of collective defense. Trump's return to power represents a historic rupture with this continuity. Unlike previous administrations that pressed allies on burden-sharing while affirming NATO's strategic value, Trump openly questions Article 5 commitments and frames European allies as "parasites". His rhetoric reframes alliances not as strategic necessities but as financial burdens requiring constant renegotiation.[4]

This shift manifests most clearly in the September 2025 Article 4 consultations. For Poland and Estonia, Russian drone incursions and airspace violations required urgent alliance solidarity. For Washington, these incidents were framed as evidence of European

overdependence rather than collective threats. The difference is stark: Eastern Europe seeks reassurance through Article 4; the US treats such consultations as proof of Allied weakness.[1][2][5][3]

Retrenchment Through Conditionality

American retrenchment in 2025 operates less through withdrawal than through conditionality. The June 2025 NATO Hague Summit commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense by 2035 exemplifies this dynamic. While presented as an Allied consensus, this target was effectively a Trump ultimatum: maintain Article 5 credibility by "paying your share".[4][6]

The 5% target represents an extraordinary increase from the longstanding 2% guideline. For most European allies, achieving 3.5% for core defense spending plus 1.5% for security-related investments will require fundamental budgetary restructuring. This burden-shifting allows the US to maintain alliance commitments formally while transferring actual responsibility to Europeans.[6][7][8]

Year	Invoked by	Reason	Outcome / Context
2003	Turkey	Iraq War concerns	Operation Display Deterrence
2012	Turkey	Shootdown of Turkish military jet by Syria; Syrian shelling Turkish cities	Operation Active Fence
2014	Latvia, Lithuania, Poland	Russian annexation of Crimea	Deployment of forces in Black Sea, aid to Ukraine, Enhanced Forward Presence
2015	Turkey	2015 Suruç bombing by ISIS	Denunciation and reassessment of NATO assets in Turkey
2020	Turkey	Northwestern Syria offensive; Syrian and Russian airstrikes on Turkish troops	Augmentation of Turkish air defenses
2022	Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia	Russian invasion of Ukraine	Defensive buildup, matériel support to Ukraine, NATO Response Force activation
2025	Poland	Russian drone incursions	NATO Operation Eastern Sentry
2025	Estonia	Russian fighter jets violating airspace	NATO Operation Eastern Sentry

Table 1: NATO Article 4 Activations Since 2001 demonstrates how rare these consultations have been historically, making the 2025 dual invocations by Poland and Estonia particularly significant as stress tests of alliance solidarity under new conditional arrangements.

Domestic Foundations of Isolationism

American public opinion provides the political foundation for this retrenchment. Despite headlines suggesting broad NATO support, deeper polling reveals concerning trends. While overall support remains at 74-76%, the partisan gap has reached historic proportions. Republican support has declined to just 59%—a 9-point drop from 2024 and the lowest level in Chicago Council polling since 1974.[9][10]

More telling is American indifference to foreign policy priorities. NATO ranks well below domestic concerns like inflation, immigration, and partisan conflicts in voter attention. The September 2025 Article 4 consultations received minimal US media coverage, crowded out by domestic political drama. This silence matters: when voters are uninformed, isolationist policies face little resistance.[1][9]

The Reagan Institute's 2025 survey offers a more optimistic reading, showing 71% support for using American military force to defend NATO allies if attacked. However, this abstract support may not translate into sustained political backing for specific

interventions, particularly in complex scenarios involving hybrid warfare or gray-zone conflicts.[11]

Erosion of Soft Power Infrastructure

Isolationist sentiment has been reinforced by systematic dismantling of America's soft power infrastructure. The Trump administration's cuts to USAID represent the most dramatic example. The Rescissions Act of 2025 withdrew approximately \$8 billion from USAID and related programs, with the agency effectively dissolved and absorbed into the State Department.[12][13]

This represents more than budgetary austerity; it reflects ideological rejection of development assistance as a tool of influence. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared, USAID "viewed its constituency as the United Nations, multinational NGOs, and the broader global community—not the US taxpayers who funded its budget". The dissolution eliminates programs that historically provided American leverage in fragile states where Russia now competes for influence.[12]

The cuts extend beyond development aid to include \$175 million for the West Bank and Gaza, \$150 million

for Iraq, and \$800 million for emergency shelter and humanitarian assistance globally. These reductions occur precisely when Russia and China are expanding their own influence operations in the Global South featuring programs like the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative which also extends into Europe and has strong implications in the Balkans.[14]

Strategic Implications of Transactional Retrenchment

The American perspective in 2025 is defined by what can be termed transactional retrenchment: maintaining military capabilities while reducing political commitment. Unlike isolationism of the 1930s, this approach does not withdraw from international engagement entirely. Instead, it reframes engagement as conditional and reciprocal.

This has several strategic implications. First, it undermines deterrence by making adversaries doubt American resolve. Russia's calculation to escalate drone incursions into NATO territory likely reflects assessments that Washington will downplay rather than escalate such provocations.[1][15]

Second, it encourages European strategic autonomy not through partnership but through abandonment anxiety. European defense spending increases represent responses to American unreliability rather than collaborative planning.[7][8]

Third, it weakens American influence in multilateral institutions precisely when competitors like Russia and China are working to reshape global governance structures.[16]

The paradox of transactional retrenchment is that by demanding greater burden-sharing, it may ultimately reduce American leverage over the outcomes that burden-sharing is meant to achieve.

Section II: The European Perspective - Between Strategic Autonomy and Internal Fragmentation


From Guaranteed Security to Conditional Partnership

The transatlantic alliance's foundational assumption—that American security guarantees were essentially unconditional—has collapsed by 2025. The June NATO

Hague Summit's commitment to 5% of GDP defense spending represents Europe's acknowledgment that security is now transactional. This shift from guarantee to conditional arrangement fundamentally alters European strategic calculations.[4][6]

The 5% target breaks down into 3.5% for core defense requirements and 1.5% for broader security investments including critical infrastructure, cyber defense, and defense industrial capacity. For most European allies, this represents more than doubling current spending levels. Germany, spending 2.1% in 2024, must reach 3.5% by 2035—an increase requiring approximately €100 billion annually.[8][17]

Figure 1: NATO Defense Spending Trends (2014-2025) illustrates the stark divergence between Eastern and Western European responses. Poland leads at 4.5% of GDP, with the Baltic states following closely, while major Western European powers lag significantly behind new requirements.



NATO Defense Spending Trends (2014-2025): Eastern European countries show dramatic increases while Western Europe lags

Europe's Uneven Strategic Awakening

European responses to American retrenchment reveal deep internal divisions. Eastern European states—Poland, the Baltics, Finland—treat the security threat as existential and respond with dramatic spending increases and closer US alignment. These countries have surpassed the traditional 2% NATO target and are approaching the new 3.5% requirement ahead of schedule.[7]

Western European reactions are more ambivalent. Germany's defense budget increases remain gradual despite facing the largest absolute spending gaps. France emphasizes "European sovereignty" but resists defense spending increases that would require significant social program cuts. Italy and Spain show even greater reluctance to meet enhanced spending targets.[18][7]

This East-West divide reflects fundamentally different threat perceptions. Eastern European leaders view Russian aggression through the lens of historical occupation and current geographical proximity. Western European leaders balance security concerns

against economic costs and domestic political constraints.[7]

The Trump-von der Leyen Trade Agreement: Economics as Security Policy

The July 2025 Trump-von der Leyen tariff agreement exposes the extent to which economic and security policies have become intertwined. The deal established a 15% tariff ceiling on most EU exports to the US, with zero tariffs on strategic products including aircraft components, semiconductors, and critical raw materials.[19][20]

However, the agreement's most significant aspect may be its conditionality. The US demanded that the EU align with American trade restrictions on both China and Russia as part of the security relationship. This linkage transforms trade policy into a loyalty test: European access to American markets becomes conditional on supporting US economic warfare against strategic competitors.[20][19]

The agreement's fragility became apparent within weeks when Trump threatened 250% tariffs on EU

pharmaceuticals despite the recent deal. This pattern—escalating pressure followed by negotiations under duress—reflects Trump's transactional approach to alliance management.[20]

The Challenge of Strategic Autonomy

Europe's aspiration for strategic autonomy faces the fundamental challenge of achieving coordination among 27 sovereign members with divergent interests. The ReArm Europe Plan, allocating €150 billion through the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, represents the most ambitious attempt yet to coordinate European defense spending.[21]


However, implementation faces numerous obstacles. Hungary routinely blocks EU sanctions and defense cooperation measures. The European Peace Facility, originally central to Ukraine support, has been sidelined due to Hungarian vetoes. Major defense procurement decisions still require unanimity, making the EU hostage to its least cooperative member.[22][23][24] The

challenge extends beyond formal procedures to strategic culture differences. Nordic countries prioritize territorial defense and NATO interoperability. Mediterranean countries focus on migration and terrorism threats from the south. Central European states emphasize deterrence against Russia.[22]

Public Opinion and the Trust Deficit

European public opinion reflects growing skepticism about American reliability, undermining the political foundations of transatlantic cooperation. Trust in the US as a reliable ally has declined sharply across major EU countries. French trust fell from 65% in 2020 to 45% in 2025; German trust dropped from 60% to 46% over the same period.[19]

Figure 2: Declining European Trust in US Reliability (2020-2025) shows this erosion of confidence has been consistent across most EU members, with Poland as a notable exception due to its continued strong security dependence on the United States.



Declining European Trust in US Reliability (2020-2025): Erosion of transatlantic confidence

This trust deficit creates a vicious cycle: European doubts about American reliability reduce political support for burden-sharing, which reinforces American perceptions of European free-riding, leading to further US retrenchment.[9]

European Defense Industrial Challenges

Europe's strategic autonomy aspirations face the reality of underdeveloped defense industrial capacity. The European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) identifies a €1.8 trillion investment gap accumulated since the end of the Cold War. Current European defense production cannot meet wartime consumption rates demonstrated in Ukraine, let alone supply a broader conflict.[25][26]


The European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) aims to address these shortfalls through coordinated procurement and industrial cooperation. However, the €300 million EDIRPA budget through 2025 is insufficient for the scale of required investment. Industry estimates suggest €100 billion in EU budget support over the next Multi-Annual Financial

Framework would be necessary to achieve meaningful defense industrial autonomy.[26][25]

The Paradox of Uneven Autonomy

Europe in 2025 presents a paradox: rising defense ambitions coupled with persistent internal divisions. European aid to Ukraine has surpassed American contributions by 2025, reaching over \$92 billion compared to declining US support. Yet this achievement masks deep coordination problems and the continued inability to achieve consensus on sanctions, arms supplies, or strategic objectives.[27]

Figure 3: Ukraine Aid Commitments (2022-2025) demonstrates Europe's growing financial leadership in supporting Ukraine, but also reveals the fragmentation of this effort across multiple bilateral channels rather than coordinated EU action.



Ukraine Aid Commitments (2022-2025): European support surpasses US contributions

The result is what can be termed uneven autonomy: Europe aspires to strategic independence but lacks the institutional cohesion to achieve it. Individual European states and sub-regional coalitions develop significant capabilities, but the EU as a whole cannot act decisively when unanimity is required.[22]

This fragmentation serves neither European interests nor alliance stability. It provides insufficient reassurance to Eastern European members facing direct Russian pressure while failing to offer the United States a credible alternative to continued military leadership in European defense.

To transcend such obstacles and translate uneven autonomy into effective group action, the EU can further the implementation of coordinated defense and industrial policies through such initiatives as the ReArm Europe Plan and Readiness 2030. Envisaged since 2025 and unlocking the mobilization of almost €800 billion of joint and national defense funds over the next decade, this plan will be supported with fiscal flexibility clauses and with investment instruments from the EU like the Security Action for Europe (SAFE). Strengthening European defense industrial capacity, reducing

dependency on external suppliers of core technologies and interoperability through coordinated procurement are central objectives. Moreover, governance reforms to reduce veto powers on crucial security and sanctions decisions and enhanced EU-UK cooperation can mitigate internal fragmentation. Economic de-risking measures, including supply chain diversification and energy resilience projects like RePowerEU, complement these efforts by reducing vulnerabilities exposed by recent geopolitical crises. By pursuing such integrated strategies combining defense, industrial, economic, and institutional reforms, the EU can build a more cohesive and credible strategic autonomy, assuring Eastern European members under direct Russian pressure and presenting a credible partnership to the United States in shared defense responsibilities.

Section III: The Russian Perspective – Opportunistic Exploitation of Transatlantic Divisions

Reading American Retrenchment as Strategic Opportunity

Russian strategic thinking has long held that NATO's strength depends fundamentally on sustained American political will rather than formal treaty obligations. When Trump openly questions Article 5 guarantees or frames NATO commitments as conditional on European burden-sharing, Moscow interprets this as confirmation of anticipated Western decline.[1][2]

The September 2025 Article 4 invocations by Poland and Estonia provided Russia with a valuable test case. Moscow's calculation appears to be that drone incursions and airspace violations will elicit measured NATO responses rather than escalatory reactions, thereby demonstrating alliance brittleness under pressure.[2][5][3][28][1]

Russian analysis likely focuses on the gap between NATO's formal procedures and American political commitment. Article 4 consultations represent collective

concern, but Washington's reluctance to treat hybrid attacks as serious threats signals that Russia can probe alliance cohesion without triggering major retaliation.[3][2]

Hybrid Warfare and Gray-Zone Operations

Russia's 2025 strategy combines direct military pressure in Ukraine with systematic gray-zone operations across NATO's eastern frontier. The drone incursions into Poland involved 19-23 unmanned systems, forcing airspace closures at major airports and triggering NATO quick reaction alerts. Similar airspace violations occurred in Estonia and Romania, creating a pattern of low-level but persistent pressure.[5][15][28]

These operations serve multiple strategic purposes. First, they test NATO response times and procedures, providing intelligence on alliance decision-making processes. Second, they create escalatory pressure that forces NATO to choose between accommodation and escalation, with either choice serving Russian interests.[2]

Third, they demonstrate Russian capability to project power beyond Ukraine's borders while remaining below thresholds that would trigger Article 5 responses. This creates a zone of ambiguity where Russian actions are clearly provocative but not sufficiently dramatic to compel decisive Western retaliation.[3]

Narrative Warfare and the "Declining West" Theme

Russia's most effective weapon may be its strategic narrative rather than its military capabilities. Russian information operations consistently promote the theme of inevitable Western decline and multipolar world order. Every NATO hesitation, every EU internal division, every transatlantic trade dispute becomes evidence supporting this narrative.[16][29]

Russian state media and proxy outlets amplify Western self-criticism and internal debates to international audiences. When American officials question NATO burden-sharing arrangements or European leaders call for strategic autonomy, Russian information operations present these as proof of alliance disintegration.[30][31]

This approach is particularly effective in the Global South, where Russian media outlets like RT have expanded operations precisely as American soft power infrastructure contracts. The dissolution of USAID and cuts to American cultural and educational programs create information vacuums that Russian outlets systematically exploit.[12][13][30]

Exploiting European Internal Divisions

Russia leverages European internal divisions through multiple channels. Hungary under Viktor Orbán serves as the most visible example, routinely blocking EU sanctions, threatening to veto Ukraine aid, and maintaining warm relations with Moscow despite the ongoing war.[22][23][32]

Russian influence operations target European decision-making processes that require unanimity. By cultivating relationships with even one or two EU member governments, Russia can paralyze collective European action on sanctions, defense cooperation, or strategic initiatives.[24][22] The European Peace Facility, originally designed to coordinate military aid to Ukraine, has been effectively sidelined due to Hungarian

objections. This forces other EU members to pursue ad hoc arrangements that are less efficient and provide fewer opportunities for strategic coordination.[22][24]

The Balkans as a Secondary Theater

Russia treats the Western Balkans as a low-cost, high-impact arena for demonstrating Western weakness. Support for Republika Srpska's secessionist rhetoric, encouragement of Serbian balancing between East and West, and exploitation of Kosovo tensions require minimal Russian investment while creating significant Western headaches.[33][34][35]

Milorad Dodik's escalating secessionist moves in Bosnia represent a particularly clear example. Russia provides political cover and rhetorical support for these actions, while Western responses remain fragmented between EU diplomatic pressure and American sanctions that lack consistent enforcement. Countries like Slovenia, where Dodik stores and invests a lot of his money, have only recently declared sanctions on the figure banning his entry, and rather than obscuring his presence he is able to rely on Hungary to further continue his moves in Srpska Krajina.[34][35][36][37][33]

The strategic logic is clear: instability in the Balkans forces NATO and EU attention away from Ukraine and demonstrates Western inability to maintain stability even in regions considered successfully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures.[38][33]

Ukraine as Leverage for Systemic Change

For Russia, Ukraine represents more than territorial conquest; it serves as the mechanism through which the post-1991 European order can be fundamentally revised. Putin's expectation appears to be that sustained pressure combined with American retrenchment will eventually force a negotiated settlement that legitimizes spheres of influence.[39][40]

Such an outcome would establish precedent extending far beyond Ukraine. If Western powers acknowledge Russian spheres of influence in exchange for conflict termination, this validates Moscow's broader challenge to universal human rights and democratic governance principles.[16]

Trump's February 2025 confrontational meeting with Zelenskyy, followed by temporary suspension of

military aid, likely encouraged Russian calculations that American support for Ukraine is ultimately conditional and negotiable. Russian officials praised the outcome of that meeting and directed criticism toward Zelenskyy rather than Washington.[39]

Strategic Synthesis: Patience and Pressure


The Russian perspective in 2025 reflects confidence that time favors Moscow's position. American political fatigue, European internal divisions, and the high costs of supporting Ukraine create pressure for negotiated settlement on terms favorable to Russian interests.[40][41]

Russia does not need to achieve decisive military victory to accomplish strategic objectives. Demonstrating

Western inability to maintain unity and resolve may be sufficient to discourage future challenges to Russian actions elsewhere.[16][29]

Every Article 4 consultation that produces limited responses, every EU summit that fails to reach consensus, every American debate about burden-sharing provides evidence for Russian claims about Western decline and multipolar world order.[30][31]

Moscow's strategy appears designed to exploit precisely the dynamics identified in Sections I and II: American transactional retrenchment and European uneven autonomy create opportunities for persistent pressure that gradually erodes Western credibility without requiring dramatic escalation.[16]



Balkan Political Flashpoints (2022-2025): Escalating regional tensions and crisis frequency

Section IV: The Balkan Perspective – Regional Fragility as Global Bellwether

The Balkans as a Test of Western Institutional Credibility

The Western Balkans represent a unique laboratory for measuring the erosion of Euro-Atlantic influence. Unlike Ukraine, these are territories where NATO and EU intervention succeeded in terminating conflicts and establishing frameworks for democratic development. The region's current instability therefore reflects not the

limits of Western power projection, but the decay of previously successful Western-led arrangements.[38][34]

The 1995 Dayton Accords and 1999 Kosovo intervention established Western credibility as conflict managers capable of imposing sustainable peace settlements. By 2025, that same region has become a symbol of Western institutional fatigue and declining resolve to maintain complex post-conflict arrangements.[33][38]

Date	Location	Type	Severity	Description
June 2022	Kosovo North	Ethnic Clashes	Medium	Clashes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, increasing tensions and sporadic violence.
October 2022	Bosnia RS	Secessionist Rhetoric	High	Milorad Dodik and Republika Srpska pushing for independence, undermining Bosnia's sovereignty.
March 2023	Kosovo-Serbia Border	Military Buildup	High	Serbian troop movements near Kosovo border causing regional alarm and risk of escalation.
August 2023	Bosnia RS	All-Serb Declaration	Very High	Republika Srpska's formal declaration escalating secessionist claims rejecting central authority.
February 2024	Bosnia RS	Constitutional Crisis	Very High	RS passing laws ignoring Bosnian state institutions, deepening institutional crisis.
June 2024	Serbia-Kosovo	Diplomatic Incident	Medium	Heightened diplomatic tensions including boycotts and breakdowns in negotiations.
March 2025	Bosnia RS	Anti-Judiciary Laws	Very High	Laws targeting judiciary, weakening rule of law and state credibility.
August 2025	Bosnia RS	Referendum Call	Very High	Dodik announces referendum on RS independence, risking constitutional crisis and conflict.

Table 5: Balkan Political Flashpoints (2022-2025) illustrates the accelerating frequency and severity of regional crises, with eight major incidents culminating in the August 2025 referendum call by Republika Srpska—the most serious challenge to Bosnia's constitutional order since Dayton.[37]

Serbia's Sophisticated Balancing Strategy

Serbia under Aleksandar Vučić has developed the most sophisticated approach to exploiting great power competition. Belgrade simultaneously pursues EU accession negotiations, maintains military cooperation agreements with Russia, and seeks Chinese investment in critical infrastructure. This multi-vector foreign policy extracts concessions from all sides while avoiding definitive commitment to any.[42]

Trump's transactional diplomacy enhances Serbia's room for maneuver. Vučić's failed attempt to meet Trump at Mar-a-Lago in May 2025, despite being denied entry to the Republican fundraiser, demonstrates both Serbia's desperation for American recognition and Washington's disengagement from Balkan management. The incident left Vučić politically weakened domestically while highlighting American inattention to regional dynamics.[42]

Serbian energy dependence on Russia provides Moscow with significant leverage despite broader European efforts to reduce such ties. Serbia's refusal to join EU sanctions against Russia reflects both economic interests and cultural affinities that Western policy has failed to counter effectively.[43][42]

Bosnia's Constitutional Crisis and Secessionist Momentum

Republika Srpska's constitutional challenge represents the most serious threat to Bosnian statehood since the 1992-95 war. Milorad Dodik's systematic undermining of state-level institutions has accelerated dramatically in 2025, culminating in laws barring Bosnian state police and judiciary from RS territory.[34][36]

The February 2025 court conviction sentencing Dodik to one year in prison and a six-year ban from public office triggered RS legislation that effectively nullifies central government authority within the entity. Dodik's August

2025 call for a referendum on these judicial decisions represents a direct challenge to the Dayton framework.[36][37][34]

Western responses have been fragmented and ineffective. American sanctions exist but lack consistent enforcement. EU diplomatic pressure produces statements of concern but no meaningful consequences. The Office of the High Representative, designed to enforce compliance with Dayton, has been reduced to issuing warnings that carry little credible threat.[34][36]

Kosovo's Fragile Independence and Northern Tensions

Kosovo represents both Western intervention's greatest success and its most vulnerable achievement. NATO's 1999 military campaign and subsequent independence recognition in 2008 established precedent for humanitarian intervention and self-determination. Yet Kosovo's sovereignty remains contested by Serbia, Russia, and several EU members.[28][38]

Tensions in northern Kosovo, where Serbian-majority municipalities resist Pristina's authority, create

recurring flashpoints that test KFOR's peacekeeping mandate. These incidents serve Russian information warfare by drawing parallels between Kosovo's independence and separatist claims in Donbas: "If Kosovo can secede, why not Donetsk?"[38]

KFOR's credibility depends heavily on American leadership, making US retrenchment particularly problematic for Kosovo's long-term stability. European allies lack the military capacity and political will to maintain Kosovo peacekeeping without substantial American participation.[38]

EU Enlargement Fatigue and Credibility Gaps

The European Union's promise of membership for Western Balkan states has lost credibility by 2025. Enlargement fatigue among existing members combines with internal EU crises to make expansion politically impossible. Hungarian obstruction of EU decision-making provides additional veto points for blocking enlargement progress.[22][38]

Without credible EU membership prospects, regional leaders lack incentives for painful domestic reforms.

Vučić delays judicial and media reforms, Dodik escalates secessionist rhetoric, and Kosovo leaders resist dialogue with Serbia because they doubt Western follow-through on promises.[38][34]

This credibility gap creates opportunities for external actors. Russia offers alternative partnerships without demanding democratic reforms or human rights compliance. China provides investment without governance conditionality. Both alternatives appear more reliable than EU promises of eventual membership.[38]

The Regional Multiplier Effect

Balkan instability serves as a multiplier of broader Western credibility problems. Each crisis demonstrates to other regions that Western security guarantees and institutional arrangements are conditional and potentially temporary. This has implications extending far beyond the Balkans themselves.[38]

If NATO cannot maintain stability in Bosnia—a territory where it successfully intervened and imposed peace settlements—why should Eastern European allies trust

Article 5 guarantees in the face of Russian pressure? If the EU cannot fulfill membership promises to Balkan applicants after two decades of negotiations, what credibility do EU security partnerships have elsewhere?[38]

Russian information operations systematically exploit these connections, presenting Balkan failures as evidence of broader Western decline. Every secessionist speech in Banja Luka or ethnic clash in northern Kosovo becomes proof that Western institutions cannot deliver on their promises.[30]

Strategic Synthesis: Local Fragility, Global Implications

The Balkan perspective reveals how local institutional weakness amplifies systemic challenges to Western credibility. The region's problems are not primarily military—no major external invasion threatens Balkan states—but rather institutional and political.[38][34]

Western failures in the Balkans result from the same dynamics identified in earlier sections: American disengagement reduces conflict management capacity

while European internal divisions prevent effective collective action. Russia exploits these gaps through low-cost influence operations that achieve disproportionate destabilizing effects.[38]

The ultimate danger is not Balkan conflict per se, but the precedent such conflicts establish for Western institutional credibility globally. If Euro-Atlantic structures cannot maintain stability in their most successful intervention zones, their deterrent effect elsewhere inevitably diminishes.[38]

Section V: Ukraine as the Central Test Case

Ukraine as the Fulcrum of Transatlantic Credibility

Ukraine has evolved beyond a regional conflict to become the definitive test of Western institutional credibility and strategic coherence. For NATO, Ukraine represents the ultimate measure of deterrent effect: if Russia succeeds in Ukraine, doubts about Article 5 guarantees will inevitably spread to the Baltic states and Poland. For the European Union, Ukraine tests whether

Europe can act as a geopolitical power or remains primarily an economic organization with foreign policy aspirations.[39][27][40][44]

For Russia, Ukraine serves as the mechanism through which the entire post-Cold War European order can be revised. A negotiated settlement acknowledging Russian territorial gains would establish precedent legitimizing spheres of influence and great power prerogatives over smaller neighbors.[41][39]

The February 2025 Trump-Zelenskyy Oval Office meeting crystallized these stakes. The confrontational encounter, ending without agreement and followed by temporary suspension of US military aid, demonstrated that American support for Ukraine is no longer unconditional. Russian officials praised the meeting's outcome, interpreting it as validation of their patient approach to Western fatigue.[39]

American Policy Oscillations and Strategic Ambiguity

American policy toward Ukraine under Trump has oscillated between rhetorical support and practical withdrawal, creating dangerous strategic ambiguity. Trump's September 2025 declaration that Ukraine "can win back all territory from Russia" marked a dramatic reversal from earlier positions advocating territorial concessions.[41][45][46]

This policy volatility appears driven more by frustration with Putin's unwillingness to negotiate than by strategic reassessment of Ukrainian capabilities. Trump's earlier meeting with Putin in Alaska failed to produce expected diplomatic breakthrough, leading to American recalibration rather than sustained policy commitment.[40][45][41]

The strategic danger lies in American policy unpredictability rather than consistent opposition or support. Adversaries and allies alike cannot calculate American responses to specific escalatory scenarios, increasing risks of miscalculation by all parties.[39][40]

European Assumption of Primary Responsibility

Europe has effectively become Ukraine's primary supporter by 2025, providing over \$186 billion in total assistance compared to declining American contributions. This represents a fundamental shift from early war dynamics when American military aid dominated international support.[27][44]

Figure 2: Ukraine Aid Commitments (2022-2025) demonstrates this transition clearly: EU aid has grown from \$28.1 billion in 2022 to \$92.4 billion in 2025, while American aid peaked at \$76.8 billion in 2023 before declining to \$48.2 billion in 2025.

However, European leadership remains fragmented across multiple bilateral channels rather than coordinated through EU institutions. The European Peace Facility, designed to coordinate military assistance, has been marginalized due to Hungarian vetoes. This forces member states to pursue ad hoc arrangements that reduce efficiency and strategic coherence.[22][24][44][27]

The Article 4 Precedent and Escalation Management

The September 2025 Article 4 invocations by Poland and Estonia over Russian drone incursions established critical precedent for NATO's approach to hybrid warfare. The consultations revealed fundamental disagreement about escalation thresholds: Eastern European members treated airspace violations as potential Article 5 triggers, while Washington emphasized restraint and proportionality.[1][2][3]

This gap in threat perception creates opportunities for Russian pressure campaigns designed to probe alliance cohesion. Moscow's calculation appears to be that persistent low-level provocations will either elicit disproportionate NATO responses—enabling Russian escalation—or inadequate NATO responses—demonstrating alliance weakness.[2][5][28][1]

NATO's response through "Operation Eastern Sentry," enhancing air patrols along the eastern frontier, represents an attempt to demonstrate resolve without escalation. However, the operation's effectiveness depends on sustained political commitment that may not survive future provocations.[3][2]

Economic Leverage and Energy Dependencies

The July 2025 Trump-von der Leyen trade agreement embedded Ukraine policy within broader transatlantic economic arrangements. European commitments to reduce Chinese trade and eliminate remaining Russian energy imports became conditions for American tariff restraint.[19][20][47]

European implementation faces significant obstacles. Hungary and Slovakia maintain extensive Russian energy dependencies that make rapid decoupling economically disruptive. von der Leyen's commitment to "put tariffs on oil supplies still coming to the European Union" represents acknowledgment that energy ties with Russia remain substantial.[47][23]

These economic linkages create additional pressure points for Russian influence operations. Energy supply disruptions or price spikes can be timed to coincide with critical political decisions about Ukraine support, creating domestic pressure for accommodation.[23][32]

Scenarios for Ukraine's Future and Their Systemic Implications

Negotiated Settlement

A Trump-mediated agreement freezing current territorial divisions would provide short-term conflict termination while establishing long-term precedent for spheres of influence. Such an outcome would validate Russian strategic patience and encourage similar pressure campaigns elsewhere.[39][41]

Protracted Conflict

Continued war without decisive outcome would strain European resources while testing American political commitment over time. Ukrainian fatigue combined with Western aid reduction could eventually force territorial concessions despite continued resistance.[44][48]

Russian Escalation and Spillover

Russian pressure extending beyond Ukraine through increased Balkan destabilization or Baltic provocations

would test whether Article 4 consultations can evolve into Article 5 responses. American retrenchment makes such escalation more likely while reducing NATO's capacity for effective response.[38]

European Strategic Autonomy Success

Sustained European aid enabling Ukrainian success while developing independent European defense capabilities would represent the most favorable outcome for long-term transatlantic relations. However, this scenario requires overcoming current internal European divisions and achieving unprecedented defense industrial coordination.[18][26][44]

Ukraine as Mirror of Transatlantic Dynamics

Ukraine reflects and amplifies every dimension of transatlantic crisis identified in previous sections. American transactional retrenchment appears in oscillating policy commitments and conditional aid arrangements. European uneven autonomy manifests in substantial financial commitments undermined by institutional fragmentation. [39][27][44][48]

Russian opportunism exploits both American inconsistency and European division through sustained pressure campaigns and information operations. Balkan parallels provide alternative models for territorial revision and great power accommodation that could be applied to Ukrainian settlement.[38][40][41]

The ultimate stakes extend beyond Ukraine itself to the credibility of Western institutions globally. As one analysis noted, "Ukraine is not only fighting for its sovereignty—it is fighting for the credibility of the entire Euro-Atlantic system".[41]

Whether that system emerges strengthened or weakened from this test will determine the international order for decades to come.

Conclusion: The Transatlantic Order at an Inflection Point

Synthesis of Perspectives and Strategic Dynamics

This analysis has examined the crisis of the transatlantic order through five interconnected perspectives that collectively reveal a system under unprecedented strain.

The American perspective demonstrates transactional retrenchment—maintaining military capabilities while reducing political commitments and making security guarantees conditional on burden-sharing arrangements. The European perspective shows uneven autonomy—rising defense ambitions and financial contributions undermined by persistent internal divisions and institutional fragmentation.[22][27][9][12]

The Russian perspective reveals systematic opportunism—exploiting Western divisions through hybrid warfare, information operations, and patient pressure designed to demonstrate declining Western credibility. The Balkan perspective illustrates how local institutional weakness amplifies global credibility problems, turning previously successful Western interventions into symbols of contemporary Western decline.[38][34][16][30]

Finally, the Ukrainian perspective integrates all these dynamics, serving as the central test case where American reliability, European cohesion, Russian patience, and regional stability converge. Ukraine's outcome will determine whether the post-Cold War European order survives, adapts, or gives way to

spheres of influence and great power accommodation.[39][27]

Key Findings and Their Implications

The evidence presented supports several critical conclusions about the trajectory of transatlantic relations:

American Conditional Engagement: The United States remains militarily engaged but politically disengaged, creating dangerous strategic ambiguity. Trump's oscillations between supporting Ukrainian territorial integrity and advocating negotiated settlements based on territorial concessions reflect domestic political calculations rather than consistent strategic assessment. This unpredictability undermines deterrence while encouraging adversary risk-taking.[41][45]

European Financial Leadership Without Strategic Coherence: Europe has assumed primary financial responsibility for Ukraine support, providing over \$186 billion compared to declining American contributions. However, this leadership remains fragmented across bilateral channels rather than coordinated through EU

institutions, reducing strategic effectiveness and enabling spoiler states like Hungary to undermine collective action.[22][24][27]

Russian Strategic Patience: Moscow's approach reflects confidence that time favors Russian interests. Rather than seeking decisive military victory, Russia pursues sustained pressure designed to demonstrate Western institutional weakness. Each Article 4 consultation that produces limited responses, each EU summit that fails to reach consensus, and each American debate about burden-sharing provides evidence supporting Russian narratives of Western decline.[16][30]

Institutional Credibility Crisis: The crisis extends beyond immediate security concerns to fundamental questions about Western institutional effectiveness. NATO's ability to respond to hybrid threats, the EU's capacity for collective action, and America's reliability as a security guarantor are all under examination simultaneously.[38][9]

Policy Implications and Strategic Recommendations

The analysis suggests several priority areas for policy intervention:

For the United States: Clarify the scope and conditions of security commitments to reduce strategic ambiguity. Restore development assistance and cultural programs to counter Russian information operations in critical regions. Balance Indo-Pacific priorities with European commitments to avoid creating false choices between theater requirements.[9][12][13]

For European Union members: Accelerate defense industrial integration to match financial pledges with capability development. Reform decision-making procedures to prevent single-state vetoes on critical security issues. Strengthen EU-UK cooperation to avoid duplication and maximize resource utilization.[22][18][25][26]

For NATO: Develop clear response frameworks for hybrid threats that bridge the gap between Article 4 consultations and Article 5 responses. Strengthen rapid response capabilities for gray-zone conflicts that fall

below traditional attack thresholds. Maintain credible deterrence in Eastern Europe while managing escalation risks.[1][2][5][3]

For Balkan Policy: Reinforce international presence in Bosnia and Kosovo with clearer deterrent mandates. Link EU assistance to concrete progress on rule of law while ensuring accession promises remain credible. Counter Russian influence through targeted support for independent media and civil society organizations.[38][34][36][30]

Forward-Looking Assessment

The transatlantic order faces a fundamental choice between adaptation and decline. The Cold War model of American leadership with European followership is ending, but its replacement remains unclear. Three scenarios appear possible:[9][11]

Managed Transition: America maintains lighter but credible commitments while Europe develops genuine strategic autonomy within alliance frameworks. This requires overcoming current internal European

divisions while maintaining American political engagement.[18][9]

Fragmented Accommodation: Continued American retrenchment combined with European fragmentation leads to ad hoc arrangements and eventually spheres of influence accommodation with Russia. This represents the most likely trajectory under current trends.[16]

Renewed Partnership: External pressure catalyzes renewed transatlantic cooperation based on more balanced burden-sharing and clearer role definitions. This would require leadership changes and strategic vision currently absent from both sides of the Atlantic.[11]

The Ukrainian Crucible

Ukraine remains the immediate test case for these broader dynamics. The conflict's outcome will signal whether Western institutions can adapt to new strategic realities or will fragment under pressure. A negotiated settlement based on territorial concessions would validate Russian strategic patience and encourage similar pressure campaigns globally. Continued

European support enabling Ukrainian success could demonstrate renewed Western effectiveness but requires unprecedented coordination.[39][27][41]

The ultimate question is not whether individual Western powers retain significant capabilities—they clearly do—but whether Western institutions can function effectively in an era of great power competition. The answer will determine international order for the next generation.[16][11]

As this analysis began, the transatlantic bargain is not collapsing overnight but fraying at the seams, caught between American conditional engagement and European fragmented autonomy. Whether this fraying can be repaired or will accelerate into systemic breakdown remains the defining question of contemporary international relations.[9][30]

The stakes could not be higher: the credibility of democratic governance, collective security arrangements, and rule-based international order all rest on the outcome of this test. Success requires recognizing the severity of current trends while maintaining capacity for strategic adaptation. Failure

invites a return to great power spheres of influence and

the international instability such arrangements have historically produced.

1.<https://www.dw.com/en/estonia-urges-nato-to-act-on-russias-airspace-violations/a-74099052>

2.<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-condemns-russia-estonian-airspace-violation-vows-defend-itself-2025-09-23/>

3.<https://apnews.com/article/nato-article-4-explainer-russia-poland-estonia-26415920dfb8458725bda517337adb12>

4.<https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/06/25/nato-leaders-agree-to-increase-defence-spending-to-5-of-gdp-at-the-hague-summit/>

5.<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/briefing-on-incursion-of-russian-aircraft-into-estonian-airspace.php>

6.<https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/natos-new-spending-target-challenges-and-risks-associated-political-signal>

7.<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/28/european-nato-allies-set-to-collectively-reach-2-spending-target-for-first-time>

8.https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf

9.<https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/americans-endorse-us-commitment-nato-though-gop-support-has-dipped>

10.<https://news.gallup.com/poll/657581/americans-foreign-policy-priorities-nato-support-unchanged.aspx>

11.<https://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan-institute/press-releases/new-reagan-institute-survey-americans-reject-isolationism-embrace-american-leader>

12.<https://www.cato.org/blog/good-start-congress-cuts-funding-usaid-other-foreign-aid-programs>

13.<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/17/us-senate-approves-cutting-billions-in-foreign-aid-as-trump-demands>

14.<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/09/24/trump-usaid-funding/>

15.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Russian_drone_incursion_into_Poland

16.<https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/sino-russian-convergence-in-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference/>

17.<https://www.suerf.org/publications/suerf-policy-notes-and-briefs/europe-in-the-new-nato-era/>

18.<https://behorizon.org/european-defence-readiness-2030-a-new-blueprint-for-strategic-autonomy/>

19.<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/statement-president-von-der-leyen-deal-tariffs-trade-von-der-leyen-wm0he>

20.<https://theloop.ecpr.eu/trumps-foreign-policy-playbook-returns-what-europe-must-learn/>

21. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en
22. <https://fiia.fi/en/publication/vetoes-from-illiberal-member-states-threaten-the-eu>
23. <https://www.dw.com/en/hungarys-orban-threatens-to-block-eu-sanctions-on-russia/a-71404115>
24. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/27/hungary-sues-eu-over-frozen-russian-assets-being-used-to-provide-ukraine-aid>
25. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/strengthening-europes-defence-capabilities-through-clear-tasks-and-objectives>
26. <https://www.asd-europe.org/news-media/news-events/news/industry-on-the-white-paper-on-the-future-of-european-defence/>
27. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/united-states-america/eu-assistance-ukraine-us-dollars_en?s=253
28. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrp6p5mj3zo>
29. <https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/artificial-intelligence/articles/10.3389/frai.2025.1566022/pdf>
30. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2vr37yd4no>
31. <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/08/17/russia-us-news-media-disinformation-campaign-00512173>
32. <https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/06/27/orban-pulls-out-the-eu-renews-17-sanctions-packages-against-russia-for-another-six-months/>
33. <https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-srpska-vucic-dodik-bosnia-genocide/32984578.html>
34. <https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/crisis-deepens-as-officials-challenge-separatist-bosnian-serb-laws>
35. <https://www.srna.rs/en/novost/1333428/dodik:-we-reject-kos'-claims-that-srpska-is-carrying-out-secession>
36. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serb-region-bars-bosnian-state-authorities-separatist-move-2025-02-28/>
37. <https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/08/republika-srpskas-legislature-calls-referendum-to-keep-dodik-in-power/>
38. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_secession_of_Republika_Srpska
39. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trump-Zelenskyy_Oval_Office_meeting
40. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/24/politics/ukraine-trump-putin-pressure>
41. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/23/us/politics/trump-russia-ukraine.html>
42. <https://www.dw.com/en/serbian-presidents-foreign-policy-strategy-in-crisis/a-72447999>
43. https://sr.wikipedia.org/sr-el/Cpeћko_Ђyкyћ
44. <https://epthinktank.eu/2025/06/26/state-of-play-eu-support-to-ukraine/>
45. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/in-major-shift-trump-says-ukraine-can-win-back-all-territory-from-russia>
46. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c07vm35rryeo>
47. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/09/24/eu-will-propose-tariffs-on-russian-oil-amid-growing-pressure-from-trump>
48. <https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine>
49. <https://peace.fes.de/security-radar-2025/country-profiles/united-states.html>

50.<https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/04/17/how-americans-view-nato-and-u-s-nato-membership/>

51.<https://www.cnbc.com/2025/06/24/this-chart-shows-how-far-nato-allies-need-to-hike-to-get-to-5percent-of-gdp.html>

52.<https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/nato-reaches-75th-year-americans-say-it-still-essential-us-security>

53.<https://donortracker.org/publications/us-funding-cuts-projecting-oda-amid-uncertainty-2025>

54.<https://www.newsweek.com/us-nato-public-opinion-spending-1793956>

55.<https://www.npr.org/sections/goats-and-soda/2025/07/01/nx-s1-5452513/trump-usaid-foreign-aid-deaths>

56.<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/american-support-nato-strong-there-wrinkle>

57.<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdj2vldpd1do>

58.https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/white-paper-european-defence-readiness-2030_en

59.<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/845186>

60.<https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/u-s-foreign-aid-freeze-dissolution-of-usaid-timeline-of-events/>

61.<https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/us-eu-trade-agreement-1/>

62.<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/25/nato-countries-budgets-compared-defence-vs-healthcare-and-education>

63.<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/21/world/europe/trump-europe-unity-eu-tariffs.html>

64.<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4en8djwyko>

65.<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg8pd2y80go>

66.https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-meetings-civil-society/csd-eu-us-political-agreement-tariffs-and-trade-2025-09-10_en

67.<https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/06/taking-the-pulse-does-meeting-the-5-percent-of-gdp-target-enable-europe-to-confront-the-russian-threat?lang=en>

68.<https://www.euronews.com/2025/09/23/nato-warns-russia-it-will-use-necessary-tools-to-defend-against-airspace-breaches>

69.<https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/09/24/von-der-leyen-fruitful-talks-with-trump-on-the-russian-gas-stop-he-is-right-we-need-to-speed-things-up/>

70.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sonja_Biserko

71.<https://2022.economicsummit.rs/speaker/ivan-vujacic/>

72.<https://piiindia.org/meet-the-panel-2/>

73.<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PUn2yW48nKc>

74.<http://rwlsee.org/all-members/serbia/>

75.<https://radar.nova.rs/autor/srecko-djukic/>

76.<https://www.cirsd.org/en/events/cirsd-launched-the-latest-book-by-ian-bremmer>

77.<https://crd.org/2020/12/22/serbia-to-prevent-smear-campaign-against-human-rights-defender-sonja-biserko/>

78.<https://www.monitor.co.me/dr-srecko-djukic-bivsi-diplomata-clan-foruma-za-medjunarodne-odnose-u-srbiji-evropo-davno-si-usnula-stigle-su-nove-generacije/>

- 79.<https://vreme.com/en/vreme/ivan-vujacic/>
- 80.<https://www.helsinki.org.rs/about.html>
- 81.<https://cordmagazine.com/opinion/dr-srecko-djukic-towards-a-new-new-world/>
- 82.<https://reporteri.net/en/lajme/bote/i-nominuani-per-ambasador-ne-serbi-njeri-i-besueshem-i-bidenit/>
- 83.<https://www.helsinki.org.rs>
- 84.<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTQSKD8hKpg>
- 85.<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3QX1xTkj1e0>
- 86.https://rs.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2012/12/sonja_biserko_an_opportunity_to_end_the_vicious_cycle_of_war.pdf
- 87.<https://newsmaxbalkans.com/svet/vesti/12024/sinteza-srecko-djukic/vest>
- 88.<https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/dodik-again-spoke-of-unifying-republika-srpska-and-serbia>
- 89.<https://news.liverpool.ac.uk/2025/08/15/bosnia-and-herzegovina-in-crisis-as-bosnian-serb-president-rallies-for-secession/>
- 90.<https://verfassungsblog.de/dodik-secessionist-constitution/>
- 91.<https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnia-deadlock-serbs-strain-exit>
- 92.<https://www.ft.com/content/096547cf-cf83-4298-820e-49b09a14972f>
- 93.<https://theconversation.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina-in-crisis-as-bosnian-serb-president-rallies-for-secession-260618>
- 94.<https://www.lse.ac.uk/LSEE-Research-on-South-Eastern-Europe/Assets/Documents/Publications/Paper-Series-on-SEE/KerLindsay-Hollow-Threat-of-Secession-in-BiH.pdf>
- 95.<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/07/16/orban-demands-eu-sanction-ukraine-over-death-of-hungarian-conscript>
- 96.<https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-russia-sanctions-hungary-slovakia-pressure/33520501.html>
- 97.[https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/2025.05.05_EUDEL_WAS_Two-Pager_on_EU_Assistance_to_Ukraine_\(May\).pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/2025.05.05_EUDEL_WAS_Two-Pager_on_EU_Assistance_to_Ukraine_(May).pdf)
- 98.<https://cpam.com/fra/en/individual/publications/experts/article/european-strategic-autonomy-also-encompasses-defense>
- 99.<https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/articles/the-future-of-european-defense>
- 100.<https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-security-cooperation-with-ukraine>
- 101.<https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue18/in-the-spotlight/strategic-autonomy-calls-for-more-cooperation-less-rhetoric>
- 102.<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/21/tracking-us-and-nato-support-for-ukraine-a-full-breakdown>
- 103.<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2025.2562975?src=>
- 104.<https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/08/president-trump-recaps-breakthroughs-in-ukraine-peace-talks/>
- 105.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_aid_to_Ukraine_during_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War

106. <https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/nato-summit-and-european-defence-5-of-gdp-for-defence-what-are-we-talking-about/>

107. <https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/us-support-for-international-engagement-sees-jump-in-reagan-foundation-poll/>

108. <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/07/europe-defence-recall-difficult-past-nato/>

109. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/economy/article/2025/04/21/how-the-west-is-losing-the-international-information-war_6740450_19.html

110. <https://globalaffairs.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/riding-shotgun-americans-want-break-driving-international-order>

111. <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/emerging-insights/russia-ai-and-future-disinformation-warfare>

Chicago citations

Deutsche Welle. "Estonia Urges NATO to Act on Russia's Airspace Violations." September 22, 2025. <https://www.dw.com/en/estonia-urges-nato-to-act-on-russias-airspace-violations/a-74099052>.

Atlantic Council. "Trump and von der Leyen Made a Deal. But the US and EU Are Drifting Apart on Trade." July 28, 2025. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trump-and-von-der-leyen-made-a-deal-but-the-us-and-eu-are-drifting-apart-on-trade/>.

NATO. "The Hague Summit Declaration." June 25, 2025. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_231713.htm.

Reuters. "NATO Condemns Russia, Estonian Airspace Violation, Vows to Defend Itself." September 23, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-condemns-russia-estonian-airspace-violation-vows-defend-itself-2025-09-23/>.

The Loop. "Trump's Foreign Policy Playbook Returns: What Europe Must Learn." August 19, 2025. <https://theloop.ecpr.eu/trumps-foreign-policy-playbook-returns-what-europe-must-learn/>.

SIPRI. "NATO's New Spending Target: Challenges and Risks Associated Political Signal." June 26, 2025. <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2025/natos-new-spending-target-challenges-and-risks-associated-political-signal>.

United Nations Security Council Report. "Briefing on Incursion of Russian Aircraft into Estonian Airspace." September 20, 2025. <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/09/briefing-on-incursion-of-russian-aircraft-into-estonian-airspace.php>.

European Western Balkans. "NATO Leaders Agree to Increase Defence Spending to 5% of GDP at The Hague Summit." June 24, 2025. <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/06/25/nato-leaders-agree-to-increase-defence-spending-to-5-of-gdp-at-the-hague-summit/>.

Al Jazeera. "In Major Shift, Trump Says Ukraine Can Win Back All Territory From Russia." September 23, 2025. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/23/in-major-shift-trump-says-ukraine-can-win-back-all-territory-from-russia>.

AP News. "Explaining NATO's Article 4 After Estonia Sought Consultations Over Russia." September 23, 2025. <https://apnews.com/article/nato-article-4-explainer-russia-poland-estonia-26415920dfb8458725bda517337adb12>.

New York Times. "How Trump Is Bringing Europe Together Again." July 21, 2025. <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/21/world/europe/trump-europe-unity-eu-tariffs.html>.

BBC. "NATO Agrees Spike in Defence Spending and Stresses Unity at The Hague." June 25, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cj4en8djwyko>.

Wikipedia. "2025 Russian Drone Incursion into Poland." September 9, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Russian_drone_incursion_into_Poland.

Euronews. "EU Will Propose Tariffs on Russian Oil Amid Growing Pressure From Trump." September 24, 2025. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/09/24/eu-will-propose-tariffs-on-russian-oil-amid-growing-pressure-from-trump>.

Elabe Poll. "Les Français et l'OTAN: Perceptions et Confiance." *Le Monde*, March 2025.

BBC. "Estonia Seeks NATO Consultation After Russian Jets Violate Airspace." September 19, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrp6p5mj3zo>.

European Commission. "CSD on the EU-US Political Agreement on Tariffs and Trade." September 9, 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-meetings-civil-society/csd-eu-us-political-agreement-tariffs-and-trade-2025-09-10_en.

Carnegie Endowment. "Taking the Pulse: Does Meeting the 5 Percent of GDP Target Enable Europe to Confront the Russian Threat?" June 25, 2025. <https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/06/taking-the-pulse-does-meeting-the-5-percent-of-gdp-target-enable-europe-to-confront-the-russian-threat?lang=en>.

European Union External Action Service. "EU Assistance to Ukraine." May 4, 2025. [https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/2025.05.05%20EUDEL%20WAS%20Two-Page%20on%20EU%20Assistance%20to%20Ukraine%20\(May\).pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2025/2025.05.05%20EUDEL%20WAS%20Two-Page%20on%20EU%20Assistance%20to%20Ukraine%20(May).pdf).

Wikipedia. "2025 Trump–Zelenskyy Oval Office Meeting." February 27, 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trump%E2%80%93Zelenskyy_Oval_Office_meeting.

Reuters. "Serb Region Bars Bosnian State Authorities in Separatist Move." February 28, 2025. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serb-region-bars-bosnian-state-authorities-separatist-move-2025-02-28/>.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. "Serbian, Ethnic Serb Leaders Urge Unity, But Avoid State Secession." June 8, 2024. <https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-srpska-vucic-dodik-bosnia-genocide/32984578.html>.

European Western Balkans. "Hungary Sues EU Over Frozen Russian Assets Being Used to Provide Ukraine Aid." August 26, 2025. <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/08/27/hungary-sues-eu-over-frozen-russian-assets-being-used-to-provide-ukraine-aid>.

Reuters. "Dodik: We Reject Kosovo's Claims That Srpska Is Carrying Out Secession." September 22, 2025. <https://www.srna.rs/en/novost/1333428/dodik-we-reject-kos-claims-that-srpska-is-carrying-out-secession>.

CNN. "Trump's New Ukraine Stance is Meant to Pressure Putin." September 24, 2025. <https://edition.cnn.com/2025/09/24/politics/ukraine-trump-putin-pressure>.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. "State of Play: EU Support to Ukraine." June 25, 2025. <https://epthinktank.eu/2025/06/26/state-of-play-eu-support-to-ukraine/>.

Gallup. "Americans' Foreign Policy Priorities, NATO Support Unchanged." March 27, 2025. <https://news.gallup.com/poll/657581/americans-foreign-policy-priorities-nato-support-unchanged.aspx>.

European Defence Agency. "Defence Data 2024-2025." 2025. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/brochures/2025-eda_defencedata_web.pdf.

Global Affairs. "Americans Endorse US Commitment to NATO, Though GOP Support Has Dipped." June 19, 2025. <https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/nato-reaches-75th-year-americans-say-it-still-essential-us-security>.

Cato Institute. "A Good Start: Congress Cuts Funding for USAID and Other Foreign Aid Programs." July 31, 2025. <https://www.cato.org/blog/good-start-congress-cuts-funding-usaid-other-foreign-aid-programs>.

Al Jazeera. "US Senate Approves Cutting Billions in Foreign Aid as Trump Demands." July 17, 2025. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/17/us-senate-approves-cutting-billions-in-foreign-aid-as-trump-demands>.

NPR. "Study: 14 Million Lives Could Be Lost Due to Trump Aid Cuts." July 1, 2025. <https://www.npr.org/sections/goats-and-soda/2025/07/01/nx-s1-5452513/trump-usaid-foreign-aid-deaths>.

Wilson Center. "American Support for NATO is Strong – But There is a Wrinkle." April 1, 2025. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/american-support-nato-strong-there-wrinkle>.

European Commission. "Future of European Defence." June 16, 2025. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/defence/future-european-defence_en.

Breaking Defense. "US Support for International Engagement Sees Jump in Reagan Foundation Poll." September 16, 2025. <https://breakingdefense.com/2025/06/us-support-for-international-engagement-sees-jump-in-reagan-foundation-poll/>.

BBC News. "Trump Moves to Cut \$5bn in Foreign Aid Already Approved." August 29, 2025. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdj2vldpd1do>.

Washington Post. "Trump Administration Eyes USAID Money to Advance Conservative Causes." September 24, 2025. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/09/24/trump-usaid-funding/>.

Policy Trade. "Trade and Sanctions Impasse—Hungary's Role." 2025. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-meetings-civil-society/csd-eu-us-political-agreement-tariffs-and-trade-2025-09-10_en.

Odnos EU sa SAD, Rusijom I Kinom

Autor: Anđela Dančetović

Evropska Unija kao jedan globalni entitet sačinjen ujedinjenjem 27 zemalja, unija koja je bogata spojem različitih kultura, jezika i načina života čini istu vodećom na geopolitičkoj sceni kada je u pitanju trgovinska razmena. Gde god se predstavnik ove fascinantne unije pojavi, ostali akteri oko nje očekuju da odmah preuzme vodeću ulogu, posebno kada su u pitanju ljudska prava, održiva energija i razvoj. Takođe, deo oko nje koji je dosta zanemaren jeste i njena funkcionalnost kada je u pitanju očuvanje mira i stabilnosti.

EU i SAD- SAD je najbliži i najvažniji partner EU zbog njihovog partnerstva u trgovinskoj razmeni i investicijama,

garantujući da je njihovo partnerstvo efektivno kada je potrebno skrenuti pažnju na razne globalne izazove. Iako je Donald J. Tramp postao 47. Predsednik SAD-a, zemlje članice i dalje idu ka tome da održavaju bilateralne odnose, ali da isto tako EU članice demonstriraju jedinstvo i vrednosti koje su uskladive uz EU. EU i SAD su jedno drugome bili najveći investitori: celokupna investicija SAD-a u EU je bila 5 puta veća od investicija u Azijsko-Pacifičkoj regiji, dok su investicije EU u SAD bile čak 10 puta veće nego kad bi se spojile EU investicije u Indiji i Kini. Januara ove godine, Tramp je usvojio „America First Trade Policy“ što zasniva kompletne i pokretljive trgovinske odnose između ostalih zemalja, uključujući i Evropsku uniju. I pored ekonomske saradnje, EU i SAD imaju i čvrstu saradnju u sektoru bezbednosti uz NATO. Potreba za učvršćivanje NATOa se javilo kada je oružani konflikt nastao na teritoriji Ukrajine gde je NATO Ukrajini pružio značajnu pomoć ali isto tako EU i SAD vode pregovore o jačanju Evropskih snaga. EU i Rusija- Rusija je Evropskoj Uniji bila ključni snabdevač energentima poput nafte, gasa i

uglja (1/3 gasa je dolazila iz Rusije). 2010 su postajali mehanizmi saradnje gde se pregovaralo o liberalizaciji viznog režima. Rusija i EU su imale relativno stabilne odnose iako je bilo nesuglasica po pitanju Kosova i Metohije, NATO-a i Gruzije 2008). Velika prekretnica u odnosima se desila 2014 godine kada je Rusija anektirala Krim i podržala separatiste u Istočnoj Ukrajini na šta je EU reagovala uvođenjem sankcija gde je bio ograničen pristup finansijskim tržištima, zabrane na izvoz određenih tehnologija i zamrzavanje imovine pojedinaca. Odnosi su prešli u fazu konfrontacije. Od 2014. do 2022 nastupio je „hladni mir“ gde je EU nastavila da zavisi od ruskog gasa iako je Evropska Unija razvijala projekte diverzifikacije (LNG terminali, gasovodi iz Norveške i Azerejdžana). Trgovina između dveju strana se nastavila iako su sankcije i dalje bile na snazi. Ruska invazija na Ukrajinu je u potpunosti prekinula ikakve odnose između

Rusije i EU, gde je EU uvela Rusiji najekstremniji vid sankcija, gde je EU morala da ubrza proces diverzifikacije, približivši se NATO-u i SAD-u. Rusija EU vidi kao

„neprijateljski blok“, dok EU Rusiju smatra egzistencijalnim bezbednosnim izazovom. EU i Kina- Kina je EU drugi najveći trgovinski partner. EU u Kinu izvozi mašine, luksuznu robu i automobile dok EU od Kine uvozi elektroniku, tekstil i industrijsku robu. Postoji deficit u korist Kine a taj deficit je jer EU više uvozi iz Kine nego što EU izvozi u Kini. Kina je pokrenula Inicijativu Pojas i Put (BRI) gde su se neke EU članice poput Grčke i Mađarske priključile u projekte infrastrukture i investicija. Evropska Unija je podeljena kada je u pitanju Kina: deo članica podržava jače ekonomske veze sa Kinom dok drugi deo članica (poput Francuske) insistiraju na oprezu i recipročnoj trgovini. 2019. je EU definisala Kinu kao partnera kada su u pitanju klimatske promene, multilateralizam i trgovinski sistem; ekonomskog konkurenta kada su u pitanju tehnologija, inovacije i trgovina i kao sistemskog rivala zbog različitih društvenih i političkih vrednosti. Velike rasprave se vode oko uloge Huawei i 5G mreže gde EU balansira između saradnje i zabrinutosti zbog bezbedonosnih rizika. EU je uvela politiku „de-risking“ (smanjenje zavisnosti od Kine), a ne potpuni „decoupling“. To znači: diversifikacija lanaca

snabdevanja, posebno u kritičnim sektorima (poluprovodnici, baterije, retki metali). Kina je dosta kritikovana od strane EU zbog ljudskih prava (posebna tačka je stavljena na poziciju Ujgura u Xinjiangu) gde Kina uzvraća kritikom da se EU meša u unutrašnja pitanja.

Odnosi između ove dve strane su, takođe, zategnuti zbog odnosa između Kine i Rusije gde EU posmatra Kinu kroz rat u Ukrajini. U suštini odnosi između dveju strana su zategnuti gde ekonomski interesi ostaju jaki iako je političko poverenje nisko. EU želi da smanji zavisnost od Kine ali je isto tako svesna da je Kina ključna za globalnu ekonomiju i klimatska pitanja. Između ova tri aktera, Evropska unija pokušava da razvije stratešku autonomiju – sposobnost da donosi odluke nezavisno, ali i da ostane verna svojim vrednostima i principima. Međutim, realnost pokazuje da je EU često prinuđena da bira između ekonomskih koristi, bezbednosnih garancija i političkih ideala. Upravo u toj dilemi leži njen najveći izazov: kako oblikovati doslednu i jedinstvenu spoljnu politiku koja će

učvrstiti kao globalnog aktera, a ne samo kao ekonomskog giganta.